Addressing the Root Causes of Terrorism
Matthew Hersey and Charles Hauss[1]

Six months after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentaton, Time's front cover raised a concern shared by just about every American. "Can we stop the next 9/11? The FBI and CIA have been in a desperate struggle to fix a broken system before the next attack comes (Time 2002)."

There is no denying the importance of "fixing the broken system" the headline refers to. However, we want to go farther than the editors of Time and most of their colleagues in the mainstream media and make two points.

First, we join our colleagues in the conflict resolution field in arguing that our response to September 11 and terrorism in general has to go much farther and address the root causes of terrorism. If we do, we can significantly reduce, but not eliminate, the support for terrorism. If, however, we rely primarily on military and other traditional approaches to national security, we could reduce the threat of terrorist attacks in the short or medium term. However, we would do little to reduce the likelihood that new and perhaps more lethal forms of terrorism will emerge in the future.

Second, we think events since September 11 have had the unintended consequence of making it possible for the conflict resolution community and national security policy makers to work together. As we will argue, neither group has all the answers for ending terrorism. Indeed, the attacks and their aftermath showed each group some important holes in its approaches to international conflict in general and terrorism in particular. And, seeing those holes afresh has made each more willing to embrace at least some of the contributions the other can make.

Before we make that argument, however, we need to make two caveats. First, do not read what follows as a criticism of the use of force since September 11. Indeed, the avenues we propose following should be viewed as complementing the war on terrorism. Second, what we are proposing is not a political "magic elixir" that would instantly rid the world of terrorism. Whatever strategies one proposes with whatever political or intellectual inspiration, there is no quick fix for terrorism. Indeed, some of the longer term proposals we make toward the end of the paper would take a decade or more to fully bear fruit.

The Premise

September 11 and everything that eddied around it were jarring events for us all. They particularly hard for the conflict resolution community to deal with because our whole raison d'être revolved around the peaceful and cooperative settling of disputes. Now, we found ourselves asking when and if it is appropriate or even necessary to use force in conflict resolution.

This was not the first time that we and our colleagues had to consider the possibility of uses the military to help build peace. Many of us had already begun posing the question with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the tragedies following the collapse of Yugoslavia, and the dozens of bloody civil wars fought in the 1980s and 1990s.

But, September 11 was different. The audacity, shock, and magnitude of the attack forced us all to rethink many of our core principles, including how we should related to traditional national security policy makers. When we help people settle disputes, we help them "reframe" their differences in new ways which make cooperation more likely. What we are suggesting here is that the conflict resolution and national security policy making communities need to reframe the way they each conceive of their role.

Our thinking along these lines has been shaped by articles written shortly after September 11 by John Paul Lederach (2001a, 2001b) and Miroslaw Volf (2001). Both are acknowledged experts on reconciliation, perhaps the most difficult to achieve goal in conflict resolution and something that was not in many people's minds in the last weeks of September 2001. Lederach is a Mennonite with years of experience helping disputants in some of the most troubled parts of the world find common ground. Volf was born and raised in Croatia and is professor of theology at the Yale Divinity School.

Lederach wrote of two voices" he felt were speaking inside of most of our heads. Both involved calls for justice, but for two markedly different types of justice.

The first voice grew out of the shock, fear, and anger most of us felt after the attacks. It included a call for traditional justice in which the perpetrators would be held accountable for their actions. For some people, this first voice included a desire—even a demand—for revenge. Most importantly for our purposes, if Lederach is right, we in the conflict resolution community were as likely to feel that way as anyone else.

The second voice calls on us to address the root cause of terrorism, to figure out "why they hate us so much." It calls for the increasingly popular concept of restorative justice, "a systematic response to crime that emphasizes healing the wounds of victims, offenders and communities caused or revealed by the criminal behaviour [and includes] practices and programs reflecting restorative purposes will: (a) identify and take steps to repair harm done, (b) involve all  stakeholders, and (c) transform the traditional relationship between communities and their governments (http://www.restorativejustice.org)." Or, as Lederach and Volf stress in their theoretical writing, true conflict resolution requires reconciliation, which in turns requires justice, mercy, and equality.

Like Lederach, Volf was away from home when the attacks occurred. In his case, he was addressing the Annual International Prayer Breakfast at the United Nations when the planes hit. Later that week he gave an interview to Christianity Todayin which he eloquently spoke to the same two voices as Lederach.

Reverend Ken Sande-whose ministry is conflict resolution-summed up this point of view more succinctly:

We draw on these Christian thinkers and practitioners here in part because they are rarely included in the work of those of us in the secular conflict resolution community. Even more importantly, we drew on them because they pose the challenge we face more squarely and more bluntly than our secular colleagues. Somehow, we have to devise policies that speak to both of Ledearch's conflicting, if not incompatible, voices.

The conflict resolution community does not have much to offer in addressing his first voice. That is the national security policy makers' area of expertise. We do, however, have a lot to say about the second voice, something the national security policy makers have little experience with (Ignatieff 2002). In short, if we are going to truly do something that makes major steps toward ending terrorism, we need each other.

What We Can't Do

Prior to September 11, the conflict resolution community had precious little to say about terrorism (though, for an exception, see Marks and Beliaev 1991). Few of the major books in the field even mentioned it. None of the major conflict resolution NGOs had ongoing projects that even indirectly addressed issues growing out of terrorism.

And, more importantly, the aftermath of September 11 showed just how empty the conflict resolution"tool kit" is for addressing terrorism, at least for now. Of the hundreds of articles on the CRInfo web site on terrorism, only about ten percent even have proposals about what to do in response.

Moreover, much of what our colleagues proposed doing in immediate response to the attacks proved to have little popular appeal or intellectual merit. Indeed, the impetus to write this chapter came after a meeting of conflict resolution scholars at the United States Institute of Peace in October 2001 at which the participants took positions which were all over the political map. Many complained that national security policy makers did not pay attention to them when they called for a stop to the fighting that had begun a few weeks earlier. One of us made the counterclaim that they might listen, but only if we had something to offer that would effectively counter terrorism at a time of global shock and national crisis.

It was not just that small group of Washington-area academics. The weekend the airwar began, we held a small workshop for a group of academic-practitioners like ourselves, which was pretty much split down the middle, half opposing the bombing, half reluctantly supporting it. When the Association for Conflict Resolution held its first annual conference the following week, it found it had no mechanisms for responding to a crisis of this sort. And, many of the leading conflict resolution and peace oriented web sites went weeks before they even added messages of sympathy to the victims.

That conflict resolution practitioners and scholars had little to offer after September 11 should not come as a surprise. No one was able to come up with viable, nonviolent responses to the attacks. The list of suggestions put forth after September 11 reads like an exercise in futility even a few short months afterward--treat it as a police action rather than a war, impose sanctions, negotiate with moderates, and so on.

That is the case, in part, because many of us come from a background in the peace movement and have never easily been able to support the use of force--if we could at all. What's more, most of our practical experience has been in other settings when it was at least possible to bring the various parties to a conflict to the table, which was not even a remote possibility with al Qaeda or the Taliban.

The conflict resolution community also failed to take one of two voices Lederach writes about which was the more important one in the minds of most political leaders and average citizens alike in the immediate aftermath of September 11 and other terrorist attacks. Terrorism is seen as a dangerous threat to the security of the countries and citizenries that were attacked. The perpetrators of such acts must be captured and held accountable for what they did even if that requires the forceful intervention by the aggrieved party and/or its allies. Although many people fell far short of demanding outright revenge after September 11, there were few who felt the actions of al Qaeda could go unpunished or that it would be possible to hold the responsible individuals accountable without some use of force.

Conflict resolution practitioners will probably never have a role to play in the kinds of actions the United States and its allies took starting on October 6. We can see no circumstances under which defense planners would even consider using us to forge a military strategy. Nor should they seek our advice on how to drop bombs or launch an invasion (though see some qualifying remarks on this in the next section).

However, if we are to be taken seriously in the areas where we do have resources to bring to bear on terrorism, we need to be far more aware of the nature of national security policy making and the demands placed on the people who make it. Put bluntly, far too many people in the conflict resolution community (and even more in the peace studies world) rejected the use of force out of hand and engaged in the kind of "image of the enemy" stereotyping of Bush administration officials the negative consequences of which we so deplore in our writing and teaching. We do not have to agree with the policies of this or any other administration. But, if we want its officials to take us seriously, we have to treat them with the same kind of dignity and respect we expect others to use in dealing with us. We also need to be able to speak their language so that they can actually “hear” what we can offer. Finally, those of us who are primarily academics, in particular, have to understand that the uncertainties and complexities of policy making are such that national political leaders can never pay as much attention to following first principles as we (and they) would like in dealing with crisis situations.

What We Can Do

Although conflict resolution is a relatively new field, it does have a proven track record of ideas and projects that could be used in other aspects of our attempts to reduce support for terrorism. These involve Lederach’s second voice in which the threat to security lies as much in the unmet human needs that give rise to terrorism and other forms of violence in the first place. Dealing with them requires the kind of engagement, capacity building, and cooperative problem solving that conflict resolution practitioners and theorists have been working on for more than a generation. There are three main areas where we in the conflict resolution community have a contribution to make, the first of which should have an impact on the short term decisions national security policy makers reach.

What follows may seem overly optimistic given the state of the world since September 11. However, as we suggest by referring to the progress in Northern Ireland, it is possible to sharply reduce terrorist violence through long-term peace building and conflict resolution.

Looking to the Long Term

When faced with a terrorist attack, national security policy makers invariably have to think about how they should respond in the days, weeks, and months that follow. Given the pressing decisions they have to make, their time frames have to be short.

What conflict resolution practitioners understand is that any process that reduces future support for terrorism will, by contrast, take a long time. That is the case, as we will see below, because there is so much anger at so many targets and over so many overlapping issues that it is impossible to imagine any kind of quick fix.

Therefore, we tend to focus on the longer term impact of our actions, including envisioning a different, less conflictual future. That perspective often leaves policy makers convinced we are little more than dreamers. However, the focus on the long term is important for policy makers to take into account for three main reasons.

First, doing so should lead them to rethink the ramifications of their actions. Because conflict analysis draws one’s attention to the “feedback” and the ways the components of an interdependent system interact over time, it leads to more pessimistic conclusions about the effectiveness of force than one commonly sees from policy makers. Whatever the short term reasons or even need for the kind of intervention we saw after September 11, conflict resolution theory suggests that it will, among other things, sew the seeds for more anger and more potential support for terrorism in the years to come.

That does lead to one short term conclusion policy makers probably should heed more than they currently do. In her pathbreaking work on NGOs in development and conflict resolution, Mary Anderson (1999) insists that they should “do no harm.” Militaries which intervene in a forceful way, by definition, do inflict harm on their foes and, alas, often to citizens who are not party to the dispute. But, given the main point of this paragraph, Anderson’s invocation could be rephrased as “do as little harm as possible.”

Second, the development of alternative, less violent, widely accepted visions over time is important for the resolution of any conflict. Intractable conflicts are not likely to end if politicians approach them with “business as usual.” Like the rest of us, they have to think “outside the box” to find solutions that might work. And that, too, takes time. As Lederach put it, “Where we are going and how we get there depends a great deal on how we define the nature of our journey, its challenges, and ultimately its proposed destination (2001b: 1).

Finally, true conflict resolution involves far more than just putting an end to the fighting—though that itself is no mean feat. In its most basic form, conflict resolution means putting the dispute to an end once and for all, and that requires the time consuming effort of addressing the underlying social issues to be overcome through a process of reconciliation, which typically occurs one person at a time.

Conflict Resolution as a Process

As is the case with any academic field, there is plenty of controversy over what conflict resolution is, let alone how to accomplish it. Everyone, however, acknowledges that, in one form or another, it is achieved through a process that encourages parties to talk (and listen) to each other and develop the common interests and trust that making lasting win/win agreements possible over time.

One of the approaches used to structure conflict resolution processes which we particularly like is known as ARIA and has been presented most recently by Jay Rothman (1997: esp. ch. 1). ARIA is an acronym that evokes the flow of an operatic work as well as the life cycle of conflict resolution.

We raise the ARIA process not because it is the best such approach, but because it is typical of many of them and because any plan to undermine the support for terrorism in the future will have to go through something like it. And, for that to happen, policy makers and others will have to commit themselves and the necessary resources to working this way for a period which, we assume, could well last for a generation or more.

Adversarial Framing. First, parties to the conflict deal with each other in a confrontational manner. More often than not, they do so without even meeting each other, as was the case between the United States and al Qaeda in the aftermath of September 11. While this is an extreme case, it should be noted that leaders of Sinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA) and the main unionist parties had never been in the same room with each other before the negotiations which culminated in the Good Friday Agreement began. Similarly, I

srael had a law that prohibited all contact between its citizens and PLO members until late 1992.

Reflective Reframing. Through track two or other diplomatic processes, the parties of the dispute are brought to the negotiating table for talks normally led by a team of neutral facilitators, such as George Mitchell and his colleagues in Northern Ireland. Clearly, we are nowhere near being able to convene such a body that would include even distant supporters of those responsible for September 11. However, as the example of Northern Ireland suggests, a time can come—and a time can be prepared--when former terrorists can sit down with their foes.

At this stage, the facilitator’s task is to get the members of the group to brainstorm. This is a procedure in which the participants present their ideas but do not criticize those put forth by their counterparts on either side. When brainstorming works, the group gets creative and comes up with ideas that had never been on the agenda before.

After brainstorming, the facilitators try to reframe the debate between the two sides. In so doing, they try to help participants see the matters under dispute from a new perspective that allows them to begin finding areas where they could agree and others where they still are far apart.

Invention This third stage can be the most difficult, because it is at this point that the participants “invent” an agreement. The facilitators may engage in more brainstorming and more reframing in an attempt to find common ground among the participants which could be the basis for a win-win outcome. In fact, the reframing to invention process usually occurs several times during negotiations to end an intractable conflict. And, it must be stressed that these discussions do not always lead to an agreement as was the case at Camp David and Taba during the last days of the Clinton administration.

Action The successful negotiation of an agreement by no means ends the process. The situation in Cyprus is illustrative. A cease fire was arranged in 1964, and a peace keeping force was sent in. It is still there.

In the absence of a full agreement that lays out a strategy for moving toward reconciliation and concrete steps to implement it, agreements that come out of the invention stage tend to be “orphaned” as Fen Osler Hampson (1996) puts it. As in Cyprus, they can leave the disputants to the dispute in political limbo with little or no progress being made above and beyond the initial agreement. Even more worrisome is the deterioration in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians which we have seen since the start of the second intifada in fall 2001.

Political Strategy

A long term commitment to a process akin to ARIA are not enough. Any attempt by conflict resolution professionals is thwart terrorism will also require a multi-dimensional political strategy, at least the broad contours of which can be laid out here.

Unmet Human Needs. Since its creation in 1980, much of the work of the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution has revolved around the human needs theories of John Burton. Burton expands on the oft used political and economic assumption that humans need only food and shelter (Burton 1996, 30). Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim expand on Burton’s work preferring to use the term ‘interests’ rather than human needs:

While an exact list of these needs is highly dependant on the culture of the individual, we generally recognize the needs of personal and group identity, security, and distributive justice to be non-negotiable by nature. (Fisher 1997, 256).

It is appropriate to question the motivations of individuals who will fly airplanes into buildings or who will engage in suicide bombings. That does not mean that we can ignore the huge social, political, and economic chasms which give rise to terrorism and to sympathizers who allow them to operate.

We are talking about more than just objective inequalities here as Ted Robert Gurr hass theory of relative deprivation. According to Gurr, violence is a variable of perceived expectations and actual capabilities (Gurr 1974). When an individual or group “gets” far less of some scarce resource than it “wants” frustration follows frustration that could lead them to lash out as terrorists or in other violent ways.

Even the gradual and incremental meeting of such needs has been shown to make a significant difference in reducing grass roots support for terrorism. Thus, as economic conditions improved and inside-the-system political opportunities opened up for Catholics in Northern Ireland, support for the IRA plummeted during the late 1980s and 1990s.

Change the coalition dynamics. Many western viewers were shocked to see how much support al Qaeda and the Taliban had, say, among students at the madrassas or religious schools in Pakistan. Such individuals, which today support terrorists groups but do not become terrorists themselves and who, later, could form the next generation of terrorists, are critical to any long-term strategy.

Can these people be convinced not to make the leap from being frustrated to violence? In a curious way, the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Influence was created to organize a perfectly legitimate public relations campaign that would use the media to help shift public opinion in these communities. For good or ill, the fact that its plans to also carry out disinformation campaigns doomed these efforts and the office itself shortly after it was created in late 2001. It remains to be seen if the new White House Office of Global Communication, created the week we finished this chapter, will enjoy any more success.

It is also critical that the allies work ever more diligently to promote the interests of moderate leaders who will enact domestic policies that would make it clear that their governments will not tolerate terrorism. Doing that will require making progress on some of the festering issues in the Middle East (e.g. Israel and Palestine, the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia) and beyond. So far, unfortunately, the United States and its allies have done precious little on this score.

In short, the goal here is to isolate terrorists and their closest supporters in the societies they are based in. It is probably going to be impossible to negotiate with al Qaeda and other terrorist leaders for the foreseeable future. The next best alternative is to create environments in which it becomes increasingly difficult for them to operate or recruit.

Again, the situation in Northern Ireland is instructive. The combination of Britain’s commitment to a strong security presence and its offering political “carrots” for good behavior by extremists on both sides went along way toward changing the climate in the province enough to get the talks started in 1994.

As Paul Arthur of the University of Ulster put it (Arthur 1998), the Major and, especially, the Blair government (took office 1997) went beyond what he calls a “security response” to a political one—“the willingness to engage in political dialogue, to examine the roots of the problem, and to search for political solutions.”

Make no mistake here. Arthur and the like do not support negotiations with terrorists who are routinely carrying out attacks. Rather, they endorse the stand taken by George Mitchell (1999) that organizations like Sinn Fein would only be allowed into the talks if they made a commitment to nonviolence and democracy. In fact, following the 1996 bombings at Canary Wharf and on The Strand, Sinn Fein participation in the talks was suspended until another unconditional cease fire was declared.

Inclusiveness of peoples and issues. Intractable conflicts such as the one of which September 11 is at the heart cannot easily be resolved because so many societies and overlapping issues are involved. The roots of al Qaeda, for instance, in the opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and more. There is no way of getting at the underlying and potential support for movements like that unless dramatic steps are taken to address all those issues.

And that can only be done if the conflict resolution process is as open to as many participants as possible. In the case of nation states, that means as many governments which are stakeholders to the dispute should be involved. So, too, should the relevant international organizations and NGOs, including those who have at least some ties or provide some intellectual support to the terrorists.

A New Global Environment

Taken together, the proposals in this section envisage creating what Jayne Docherty and Lisa Schirch (2001) a global environment that does not support terrorism. Completely eliminating terrorism and the milieus from which it springs is not a viable possibility for the foreseeable future. However, a combination of multilateral negotiations, improved education and social services, economic development, public relations, political engagement, and a sprit of openness can reduce the number of people who feel so frustrated and alienated that they might turn to terrorism and, at the same time, make it clear that the costs of turning to it will rise to an unacceptable level.

These kinds of activities are in our toolbox. As Derek Sweetman (2001) put it:

The Time is Ripe

As we write in the summer of 2002, the time is nowhere near ripe yet for the start of a full-fledged conflict resolution process. To cite but the most obvious example, there is nothing approaching a hurting stalemate between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the various terrorist networks on the other.

However, the time is ripe for the conflict resolution and national security policy making communities to work together on these issues. One of the conclusions we reached in writing this chapter is that neither the conflict resolution community nor the national security policy makers have a chance of dealing a major blow to terrorism on its own. Military options may be necessary, but it cannot do much to undercut the anger and frustration that give rise to terrorism, at least in the medium to long term. Conflict resolution professionals may not have the tools to address how to react in the immediate aftermath of an attack like those of September 11, but we do have tools that have already been used to defuse intractable conflicts.

September 11 served as a wake-up call for many in the conflict resolution field. Along with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, many of the bloody conflicts in the third world, and the wars in Yugoslavia, it has led many of us to both the potential force can play in conflict settings and the importance of our learning to work constructively with national security policy makers.

There is evidence, too, that at least some national security policy makers understand that they can’t go it alone. For instance, in the days after September 11, the left-wing journalist, David Corn (2001), was struck by how open many traditionally conservative policy makers were to considering new, non-military supplements to the use of force. Jerrold Post, who created the CIA’s program to do psychological profiling, claimed that the overarching problem we face is the “rolling hatred within the Arabar world directed at the United States. America doesn’t have the vaguest idea how much hatred. H. Allen Holmes who served at both the Pentagon and State Department claimed that “we must provide assistance and listen to other states, including states hitherto regarded as rogue states. In a war on terrorism, there will be no victory. We can contain it, slow it down, diminish it. But only if we put together a grand coalition for the long haul to do something about the sources of terrorism.”

Another indirect indicator that it is possible and necessary for the two groups to work together is the State Department’s web site on conflict resolution and the current crisis (http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/conflict/). As far as we know, this is the first time a United States government agency has had a site of this sort. That’s the good news. The bad news is that it only lists about a third of the major NGOs in the field, among those missing are Search for Common Ground and the Foundation for Global Community.

The notion that conflict resolution practitioners and national security policy makers can work together is not a pipe dream. By the time this book is actually published, we will have participated in a three day workshop organized by the United States Institute of Peace in which senior conflict resolution professionals and policy makers will consider how they could work together or at least complement each other’s work in a wide variety of foreign policy issues. That workshop is designed to be the first step toward creating an ongoing dialogue between the two communities and all the synergies that might flow from it.

In conclusion, we reach the same conclusion about terrorism that Thomas Homer-Dixon (2000) about a range of social, economic, and environmental issues. He spoke of an “ingenuity gap” in which there is no shortage of information available to scholars or policy makers. If we have a shortage of anything, it is new and creative ideas. From what we have seen in writing this chapter and this book as a whole, we are in desperate need of new ideas for dealing with terrorism. And, if we are right, that “gap” can only be closed by people with very different perspectives coming together and generating new strategies and approaches to what could well prove to be the most dangerous form of conflict during the first years of the twenty first century.

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