This was written in September 1997. It
will be updated soon.
Of all the countries covered in Comparative Politics, it is hardest to get information on Nigeria unless something dreadful happens there to bring the country to the attention of western policy makers and journalists. Little of that has happened since the 1995 execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. Since then, for good or ill, most of political life has revolved around the familiar, not very exciting, and not altogethr credible claims by the current military government that it is preparing to return to civilian and democratic rule.
It is now just about four years since General Sani Abacha seized power when the attempt of the last military government headed by Ibrahim Babangida to return to civilian rule collapsed. Like his fellow officers who preceded him, Abacha has claimed the military only plans to rule for a brief period, but also like his predecessors, his statements have been received with considerable skepticism both inside the country and out.
In March, the government did allow local elections which The Economist described as Òone of the most peaceful and seemingly well-supported elections since the country became independent in 1960.Ó It should also be pointed out that two paragraphs later, the same article noted that Òvote-buying and influence-peddling flourished.Ó
One should not make too much of the elections even from the most optimistic of perspectives regarding Nigerian politics. Local elections do not and will not matter much in a country in which national elections have brought so much trouble. Moreover, the leading opposition group, NADECO (National Democratic Coalition) was not allowed to run candidates and dismissed the five officially registered parties as Òfive fingers of the same hand.Ó
On 1 July, the government announced that elections for President, Congress, and 30 state governors will be held on 1 August 1998. The formal handover to civilian rule would follow on 1 October 1998. Immediately after the announcement, doubts were raised about the plans when Abacha made it clear that he was seriously considering running for president himself.
Human right abuses remain. The apparent winner of the 1993 presidential election, Moshood Abiola, is still in detention as is former President Olusegun Obesanjo. Exiled Nobel Prize-winning author Wole Soyinka and 14 of his colleagues have been indicted on what everyone outside the governments acknowledges are trumped-up charges of treason following a series of bomb blasts in Lagos in January. Eleven of the defendants were in the country, and they all face the possibility of a death sentence. To make matters even worse, one international survey recently ranked Nigeria the most corrupt country in the world. Soyinka summed up the stalemate and the likely future of the opposition-military government relationship as follows. "The dissent in Nigeria has been there from the very beginning and will not go away until Abacha has gone. But this is a marathon, not a sprint."
The US government is in the midst of a review of its policies toward Nigeria after acknowledging that more than three years of pressures and sanctions did nothing to budge the Abacha regime. Not only has the US objected to military rule but criticized Nigeria as one of the countries that does not cooperate with it on drugs trafficking policy and as a country with corrupt business practices that have bilked a number of American firms out of millions of dollars. The Clinton administration seems likely to try more cooperative and conciliatory policies, but the state or US-Nigerian relations has deteriorated so far that Washington is not likely to have much of an impact.
Simultaneously, the British Commonwealth is looking into taking a harder line as the new Labour government tries to chart a more ÒethicalÓ foreign policy. Nigerian matters played a major role at its July 1997 meeting with some participants urging its expulsion from the body. Ken Wiwa, son of the executed activist said, "The Nigerian authorities are very worried about the effect of expulsion on their image, and at home. The effect would be stunning." The Nigerian government, of course, reacted angrily to any such idea. Foreign Minister Tom Akimi stated that "The hostile attitude and the use of bodies like CMAG [Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group] contains the seeds of the future disintegration of the Commonwealth." Less impassioned observers noted that the Commonwealth had been highly critical of Nigeria since Saro-WiwaÕs execution in 1995, but as with the US, its actions had not matched its rhetoric.
There were other issues in Nigeria this year.
The economy is doing somewhat better. Increased oil revenues has allowed the government, for instance, to double expenditures for rural development programs.
The government also launched a massive assault on criminals who had turned Lagos into one of the most dangerous cities in the world. ÒOperation SweepÓ involved more than 4,000 soldiers and police personnel. Armed robberies and car thefts have both been cut by at least 80%.
Perhaps more important in the short run has been the controversial role Nigeria has played in the traumatic politics of Sierra Leone after having helped end the carnage in Liberia. For the first four months of 1997, about 900 Nigerian troops were there as part of the ECOMOG, the West African peacekeeping force. In late May, however, a coup overthrew the democratically elected government. On 2 June, Nigerian forces intervened, shelling the port of Freetown and seizing its airport. Many international observers commented cynically that the Nigerian only sided with the overthrown government in an attempt to restore its credibility rather than out of any commitment to democracy.
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