CONF 735: GLOBAL CONTEXT OF CONFLICT
Professor Ho-Won Jeong
George Mason University
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
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Student Papers
Jihan Al-Alaily
Dr Ho-Won Jeong
CONF 735
25 November, 2001
September 11: A Case of Asymmetric Conflict
September 11 put an end to the myth about the US invulnerability on the home
land front. Concepts of security as preparing for dangers that were familiar
rather than likely began to crumble. The heinous attacks on the World Trade
Centre and on the Pentagon brought new understanding to the meanings of 'asymmetric'
conflicts, were the weak party responded with low tech capabilities to high
tech weapons. 'Operation Enduring Justice' was put together in haste, with the
declared aim of prevailing over terrorists, without clear definitions of; who
against, how and where.
In the course of what happened on September 11 and the present war, where the United States is fighting a highly asymmetric conflict, we would like to examine the concepts of security that underlie the actions of both sides; the United States and Osama Bin Laden, whom it has declared as the prime suspect responsible for the attacks.
We will also be investigating the relationship between security, identity and the state.
This paper will also examine to what extent sheer force and the use of advanced technology can subdue the new asymmetric enemy whose mobility, agility and reach has been bolstered by the forces of globalization.
It is also our contention that you cannot fight the new enemy who has the means, the anger and the suicidal drive in order to hurt a great power solely with brute force and the accompanying diplomatic tools. We think that a relevant concept of security in this situation is one that understands and addresses the root causes that feed the terrorists anger. A strategy to win the hearts and minds of the Moslem people rather than sending ultimatums of 'either you are with us or against us,' is the only way forward to isolate the terrorists from the mass anger and resentment felt in the region against US policies- presumably is what the terrorists feed on.
Asymmetric Conflicts
The cold war marked the end of an era where wars were essentially waged between states. In the new era of asymmetric conflicts, new wars are likely to emerge which have different characteristics than the old fashioned wars. They have to be understood in the context of globalization. They rely on transnational networks, they exploit grievances in the name of religion and ethnicity to mobilize people and to get money, arms and mercenaries. In the wars they wage, "the goal is not military victory but political mobilization." [1] Their aim is to expand their networks of extremism. With the rise in asymmetric conflicts, there has been a marked escalation also in violence directed at civilians. The aim is to create fear, eliminate moderate voices and destabilize existing systems with the ensuing chaos.
In asymmetric conflicts, the disadvantages side makes up for the gap in power and fighting abilities with the strong side by avoiding its strengths and concentrating on its vulnerabilities. So in other words, "asymmetry is about the qualitative difference in the means, values and style of the new enemies." [2]
The US Commission on National Security/21st Century which was tasked several years ago to prepare a comprehensive review of the national security doctrine and how it can be adapted to security threats in the 21st century have ominously warned in its first report in 1999, that the United State will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on the American homeland, and that US military superiority will not entirely protect it.
"American influence will increasingly be both embraced and resented abroad, as US cultural, economic, and political power persists and perhaps spreads. States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possible in large numbers." [3]
Analysts and scholars have talked about two distinct concepts emerging in the
debate over how to respond to the challenges of the new wars. [4]
The first group which is concerned with the fourth generation warfare, stateless
or asymmetric proposes a rethink of the usefulness of Stealth bombers, cruise
missiles and unmanned delivery systems, if a few men with suicidal motivations
can successfully attack the symbols of US power and wealth.
The second concept has been the national missile defense shield to protect America from incoming ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction. September 11 has shattered the myth which belies the usefulness of this system, that the US can bomb rogue states at a distance, safe in the knowledge that its territories are protected.
The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld in a recent article in the Washington Post entitled "Beyond this War on Terrorism," besides his ludicrous suggestion to "liquidate the terrorist networks so they can no longer threaten our people," proceeded to outline what needs to be done to prepare of the next war.
"To deal with surprise we must shift our defense planning from the "threat-based" model that has dominated thinking in the past to a "capabilities-based" model for the future. Instead of focusing on who our next adversary might be or where a war might occur, we must focus on how an adversary might fight-and develop new capabilities to deter and defeat that adversary."
"Instead of planning for conventional wars in precisely defined theatres, we must plan for new and different adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception and asymmetric weapons (such as civilian airliners turned into missiles) to achieve their objective." [5]
The problem with the present war and with the imagined next war -with its focus on "capabilities"- is that there is too much reliance on military force to defeat the uneven, asymmetric opponents. America is currently acting as a nation-state, brandishing its military might to satisfy public demands for retributive responses. Also besides putting the emphasis on military action, America is still reliant on alliances with states in the fight against terrorism.
How the state has changed in relation to its "security function' has conceptually been challenged since the end of the Cold War era. The author Mathias Albert would argue that with the rise of new threats like international terrorism, states can no longer preserve their operative autonomy and their system boundary which had earlier emerged as the undisputed meaning of security during the Cold War. [6]
Albert argues that we need to pay attention to the complexities of different systems or system-sub-system-distinctions as well as to the notion of system evolution to understand the changing nature of the 'state' and the changing nature of security.
Bin Laden with his militant ideology cannot be understood nor fought with reference to state models such as the "Westphalian state". He does not control territory, nor does he have monopoly over use of legitimate violence on a certain territory. Consequently, military action against him, with the aim-- as defined in old fashioned wars-of capturing territory and destroying the enemy, defined as entire states and military machines and destroying enemy casualties is somewhat useless. With all the military might that the US has brought to bear in the current war in Afghanistan, resulting in untold civilian casualties and psychological trauma, Bin Laden and his associates have until now evaded capture. Perhaps the reality of the situation has best been told at one of the Pentagon briefings, on the third of November, when in answer to a question of how close the US was to capturing Bin Laden, Navy Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem said, "do we know how close we are? That's a very difficult question to ask, because I'm sure that there are times when we feel very close and other times it's a shadow."
That is part of the new reality of asymmetric enemies; elusive, not easily isolated, can penetrate systems and hide within them.
In fact their complex modus operandi as well as their reason d'etre is best understood in the context of globalization. "These networks flourish in those areas of the world where states have imploded as a consequence of the impact of globalization on formerly closed, authoritarian systems, and they involve private groups and war lords as well as remnants of the state apparatus." [7]
Bin Laden is rather a sub system of the international political system in contradiction with the latter's operative logic and exerting a destructive influence on its evolutionary status. It is perhaps necessary, in keeping with Mathias Albert conceptual framework of security as a boundary function, for the international community to modify its boundary functions of securitization to cope with the increasing risk that is posed by other systems or sub systems (like that of Bin Laden), but that cannot be contained in the system he is embedded in.
That is why it is completely misleading to focus on capabilities, 'how an adversary might fight' as opposed to 'who our next adversary might be' as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is suggesting. The questions of 'who and why do they hate us' opens the door to study the adversary's frustration that led to their aggression, that manifested itself in an inward attitude of hatred and in an outward behavior of violence. It forces policy makers to ask --not necessarily to agree with but in order to understand-- what are the adversary's unrealized goals/basic needs that forced them to use violence in such a horrific way.
One of the US top former officers, General Charles Boyd, USAF, who was executive director of the US Commission on national Security/21st century signaled two distinct development that fundamentally affects concepts of US National Security; 1-the level of hatred for Americans around the world, 2-the degree to which technologies will continue to proliferate into the hands of nations and private individuals. He said in a recent published interview, "That changes everything in my mind. If someone now has the means, the anger, the resentment and the tools to hurt a great power, we fundamentally have to readjust our thinking about the nature of the threat and who our enemies really are." [8]
With the focus on capabilities, maintaining America's existing military advantages and developing other means that Rumsfeld discussed, ( ensure persistent surveillance, tracking and rapid engagement of an adversary's forces and capabilities. Enhance the capability and survivability of US space systems, develop new ways to harness information technology), there is a real danger of escalation of violence. We are told that the campaign is going to be long and sustained and covering many fronts and therein lays a grim prospect.
Again it is useful to state that waging a conventional war against war lords, and militias who are not accountable to the conventions of a state is not a useful guarantor of security.
Some analysts have warned of the ominous consequences of the US adopting some of Israeli-style asymmetric warfare in its conflict with the Palestinians. The policy of using asymmetric means, like F-16s and missile gun ships against stone throwers and some activists with guns, have not brought any notion of real security to the Israelis. Instead more suicide bombings happened inside Israel in the past five years than in the entire 51 years conflict, and for the first time an Israeli politician is assassinated inside Israel by Palestinians. Analyst Marwan Bishara sees the shift as detrimental to US security, "Listening to Bush, it is clear that US strategy is heading towards Israeli-style asymmetric warfare, even though it failed in Palestine. This choice would be a catastrophe." [9]
Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the New Asymmetric Enemy
If we turn to Al Qaeda network and its ring leader, Bin Laden, who represents in this conflict the post modern war adversary, it is clear to us that his strength lies not in any military ability or control over geo-strategic territory or any structured popular support but in his formidable ability to wage a cultural war against the US and the West. His battle is over the hearts and minds of those angry masses in the Arab and Moslem world that see themselves as suffering at the hands of arrogant US hegemony. Through propaganda and terrorism he is seen as representing the grievances of Arab and Moslem masses toward the US and toward their own rulers.
Bin Laden and Al Qaeda network do not represent Islam and their statements
and actions directly contradict the basic teachings and principles of the Faith.
It is true that Moslems may wage war to fight injustice but that is governed
by so many regulations. The theory of jihad (struggle in the path of God) "forbids
violence except when 1- Moslems are not allowed to practice their faith (freedom
of religion is threatened) 2- when people are oppressed and subjugated (in pursuit
of freedom) and 3- when people's land is forcibly taken from them." [10]
While Islam permits war to end persecution and in search of justice, it clearly forbids the killing or even the injuring of non combatants. Those who rationalize indiscriminate violence are clearly in contradiction with the body and spirit of the Quran. One of the strongest rulings against such killings is seen in the following Quranic verse:
He who has killed one innocent soul, it is as if he has killed all humanity. And he who has saved one soul, is as if he has saved all humanity (Quran 5:32)
Many scholars have talked about the tension between realism and idealism in Islam. There are ranges of responses that Islam sanctions in the face of aggression. One approach stresses forgiveness of the oppressor while another calls for a response in kind. [11]
Tell those who disbelieve that if they cease persecution of believers that which is past will be forgiven them (8:38).
And slay them wherever you find them, and drive them out of the places from where they drove you out, for persecution is worse than killing (2:191).
It is clear that Moslem fundamentalists like Bin Laden favor the latter verse. But still the sanctity of life is sacred in Islam that no justification for killing civilians is accepted.
Bin Laden, it appears, uses religion as a cultural tool for mobilization and for political purposes. Islamic Political violence has for a long time been one of the few outlets in the region for political protest and action. But with the advent of the so called 'Afghan Arabs' [those who fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan with great support from the CIA] the phenomenon of Islamic political violence has no doubt entered a new and ominous phase.
Through the religious discourse Bin Laden addresses nationalist and anti-imperialist issues that are portrayed as threatening to the Islamic identity of the nation, the ummah. The Islamic discourse also has a social component which allows Bin Laden to raise issues of corruption and injustices and to press on the duty to fight the oppressor. The message of Bin Laden will be explained later in this paper. We will now turn to the context which saw his rise and that of Al Qaeda network, for a further understanding of this new asymmetric enemy.
The Context
What makes the Bin Laden and Al Qaeda phenomenon so unique is their targeting US interests almost exclusively. Their operations are global, including the US mainland as well as in more than 50 countries (according to the State Department) and their recruitment is transnational. Their finance comes from wealthy sympathizers as well as from charitable organization in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. Their actions are not constrained by power calculations or by fear of US military capabilities.
The mujahedeen along with Bin Laden believe that they had not only liberated Afghanistan from the Soviet Union but they equally credit themselves with the demise of the Soviet Union that followed. So from that perspective, they are not afraid to take the US bull by the horn. They attribute their success in Afghanistan to fighting with valor, faith and sacrifice. On the other hand, Bin Laden has spoken about the US as a 'paper tiger' with much vulnerability. He repeatedly cites the American defeat in Vietnam and retreats from such places like Lebanon and Somalia. The three cases were example of asymmetric conflicts between the US and its adversaries. In contrast to the 'valor' of the mujahedeen, he is reported to have spoken in an old ABC News interview about "the weakness of the American soldier, who is ready to wage cold wars and unprepared to fight long wars." [12]
To recap, Bin Laden's methodology is one that avoids the US military strengths and concentrates on its vulnerabilities. The qualitative differences in values that he tries to sharpen; is a difference between perceived US moral weaknesses on the one hand and faith-inspired suicidal commitment of the mujahid on the other.
The Message
Bin Laden's message unlike other cults of deaths that emerged in Europe and the US in the past decades, is neither individualistic nor is it isolated from the context of the masses, but instead it resonates with their grievances very well. Bin Laden's message is couched in religious language, its tool is jihad and its target is the US which is seen by many Moslems as the cause of direct, structural and cultural violence against them. [13]
In all his statements, he emerges as the champion of the most basic grievances of the Arab and Islamic nation, the ummah. Though in his early messages, Bin Laden spoke only partially about the Palestinian question, yet most recently he has introduced this element opportunistically into his discourse as he knows that the question of Palestine is central to the collective Arab and Moslem Identity.
He very powerfully articulated in his statements the sense of humiliation that the Ummah has suffered at the hands of the West as far back as the Belfour Declaration of 1917, when the British imperial power of the day, as the holder of the mandate in Palestine gave the first promise for the creation of a Jewish state on parts of the historic land of Palestine. He further challenged the US foreign policy practices in the region and its impact on the poor and downtrodden in the Moslem world. In his taped remarks aired on Qatar's Al-Jazeera television following the September 11 attacks he said:
"Our nation [the Islamic World] has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation for more than 80 years. Its sons are killed, its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked, and no one hears and no one heeds." [14]
He has particularly emerged as a spokesman and opinion maker for the oppressed masses in the Islamic nation who champions the causes of the innocent civilians in Iraq in Palestine .
"Millions of children are being killed as I speak. They are being killed in Iraq without committing any sin,… In these days Israeli tanks infest Palestine-in Jenin, Ramallah, Rafah, Beit Jala and other places in the land of Islam- and we don't hear anyone raising his voice or moving a limb." [15]
Most importantly his message is a defiant message. The US is portrayed as evil
and that it can and must be resisted and that it can be done employing jihad.
"May God show them his wrath and give them what they deserve." [16]
Terrorism exploits anger and despair. Bin Laden's messages are very empowering to people living this despair. Equally, it offers alternatives to the perceived impotency of the ruling regimes. In the eyes of the impoverished masses, those regimes have been losing their legitimacy to the degree that they've allowed US hegemonic practices to rein over the region. He fuels this anger by his strong rejection of the presence of the US troops in the land which hosts the two most important holy sites, Mecca and Medina. In other words Bin Laden is operating in an environment receptive to change through violent actions.
Bin Laden's message plus the terrorist acts of Sept 11, whether he is to blame for it or not, provide a road map for action. They show that with a handful of box cutters or low tech weapons, the impoverished masses can bloody the nose of the only superpower left in the world and can shake up the world order.
Security as a Boundary Function
In the current war on terrorism, the boundary function of security that resonates with the American sense of identity is one that excludes the likes of Bin Laden, Al Qaeda network and the Taliban regime. They have been securitized as 'cold blooded terrorists', 'evil doers' who hate 'our values' and who are 'criminals' who have 'no religion and no human cause'.
For Bin Laden, the boundary function, in which he has cast the US foreign policy in the Middle East is one in which it is seen as inherently opposed to Islam and Moslems. It is also one in which it is seen as a hypocritical super power, applying double standards, killing innocent civilians and propping up corrupt Moslem regimes. This image is simultaneously presented as posing a threat to the identity of Moslems.
In short and like President Bush who narrowed the choices before the world to; 'you are either with us or with the terrorists', Bin Laden's world also has two categories, 'the side of the believers and the side of infidels.' The rhetoric of both sides highly suggests the framing of this conflict as a "clash of civilization."
But from reading Bin Laden's text we can detect another level of security that is more inclusive of the 'other' which is not matched in the US position.
"I swear by God, who has elevated the skies without pillars, neither America nor the people who live in it will dream of security before we live it in Palestine, and not before all the infidel armies leave the land of Mohammed, peace be upon him." [17]
Implied in his plan that as long as the US maintains its asymmetric and one sided policy in the Palestinian Israeli conflict, there will be no peace. Unless the US is seen by Arabs and Muslims as more evenhanded in the Middle East and more sensitive to cultural and religious sanctities and sensibilities, Bin Laden does not rule out violence through terror or otherwise to redress that balance.
It can be argued that Bin Laden's model of common security is not that of the traditional Cold War paradigm of national security which sees things in zero-sum, win/lose terms. His means of delivery may include terror and his targets may include civilians, but the security he is advocating is not one that excludes the US per se. There is a strong conditionality to accepting the US, but if we believe the writings in one of Al Qaeda booklets which states that "our aim is to make the Americans leave the Gulf," then there is reason to believe that if that issue is redressed, then a future relationship of positive-sum terms or a "win-win" situation may not be inconceivable. After all, Bin Laden and his company of mujahedeens were regarded by America as freedom fighters when they were slitting the throats of the Soviet soldiers in occupied Afghanistan.
In his reframing of perceptions and perspectives, there is a place for a US with all its might and values, where as in the US framing of its national security there is neither room for Bin Laden nor for the grievances that he claims to stand for.
Bin Laden challenging the Saudi Regime
Bin Laden has further challenged the legitimacy of the Moslem regimes that support the US, particularly the Saudi regime. "They [the US] have come out in force with their men and have turned even the countries that belong to Islam to this treachery, and they want to wag their tail at God, to fight Islam, to suppress people in the name of terrorism." [18]
September 11, the fact that 15 of the 19 suspects of the attacks are reported to have come from Saudi Arabia and tension over the publicized use of the Prince Bandar military base outside Riyadh as the key command and control centre for the US led military operation, Enduring Freedom, in this war, has surfaced constraints in the US Saudi relations like never before. This has been manifest in the virulent media campaigns in the two countries and in some unusually critical statements of the US by some top Saudi officials.
The security of the House of Saud has over the years come to depend on the interplay of several factors. The first is the social contract made between the ruling family and the Wahabi sect which swept the family into power, the second is oil and the third is the connection with the US to ensure their own security. [19]
Bin Laden by insisting that "the infidel armies leave the land of Mohammed", has not only aired popular resentment at the presence of American troops on Saudi soil, but equally he has exposed a serious rift between the House of Saud and the purist Wahabi elements in the kingdom.
Adel Al-Jubeir, a Saudi foreign policy adviser explained the current dilemma facing the Saudi regime between keeping their military alliance strong with the US and maintaining their purist Islamic credentials. In reply to a question over how public can the Saudi regime be about the US usage of the military base, he said, "touting the command and control activities being carried out at the base might make the Saudis 'heroes in Washington', explained al-Jubair. "But we may suffer consequences in the Moslem World. Our challenge has always been: How do you balance between the two? Given a choice, we'd rather look good in down town Riyadh than downtown Washington."
By affirming that the security of the Saudi royal family is first and foremost in its adherence to the Wahabi doctrines, it becomes evident that a perceived weakness or tension in this umbilical link will be seen within the devout Saudi society as a societal security issue i.e.; pausing a threat to it in identity terms.
Bin Laden exploited a situation whereby he presented the Saudi State as what Mathias Albert might say, not serving as an 'efficient reference point for the construction and reconstruction of collective identity, necessary to stabilize expectations in the governing system. In that way he is de-legitimizing the Saudi regime in the eyes of the public and inviting them to rise up against it.
Globalization and Security
Globalization seen by people in the Arab and Moslem World as Americanization and westernization has had a great destabilizing impact on local identity. Many of these old and traditional societies have not yet found a model of modernity in which they can develop but at the same time protect their religious and social values from what they perceive as the 'moral decay' of the west.
Identity as "an assured sense of self: a comfortable concept of who one is and a confidence that society will respect and preserve this way of being" has become unsteady and uncertain with globalization. [20]
The spread of supra -territoriality with its homogenizing impact, where one culture tries to sweep away other identities, has undermined many local cultures.
This anti-globalization message has been harped upon Moslem and Arab societies both from secular and religious perspectives. One of the most respected Islamic scholars in the Gulf region, Sheikh Yousuf Al Qaradawi has fiercely criticized the concept of globalization as a "new kind of colonialism, which is synonymous with Americanization." His message was aired to coincide with the start of the new round of talks of the World Trade Organization which took place in the Gulf State of Qatar early in November, 2001.
Most militant Islamic fundamentalist have rejected globalization. It is not hard to understand why the impoverished masses in this region have proven receptive to Bin Laden's political message. In their quest for justice and freedom, the victims of globalization also see themselves as suffering from US hegemony over their lives.
Conclusion
Bin Laden is by no means regarded in the Arab and Moslem world as a great warrior. In fact many people are aware of his un-inclusive religious message which is primarily reactionary, misogynistic and morally repressive.
But Bin Laden's political message falls on many receptive ears. He has given a voice and a sword to the voiceless, dispossessed and marginalized. His terror is almost exclusively directed at the US which many regard as the cause of their humiliation and suffering. In short he has addressed issues of identity [ the sense of Moslem self, who they are and giving assurance that society will respect and preserve the essence of Moslem being], which many believe has been trampled upon by Americanization and globalization.
On the other hand, it is very clear that the framing of the war against terror that the Bush Administration is conducting, has no clear definition of what terror is, who exactly is the enemy and what is the scope of this confrontation. Instead a war of retribution is taking place with the initial goals of "eliminating' Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. By focusing solely on the act of terror on September 11, the US politicians have failed to see the writing on the wall, the root causes of this hatred to America.
This attitude may make America win the battle but lose the war, as some have noted. Bush's latest statement that "Afghanistan is just the beginning of the war against terror" is a recipe for escalation that is bound to happen with or without Bin Laden at the scene.
With asymmetric conflicts, security as a positive sum is a lot more realistic
than the prevalent concept of security in terms of zero-sum win/lose terms.
There has to be an effort on America's part to win the hearts and minds of the
marginalized in the Middle East region to counter the strategy of political
Islamic violence. There has to be an alternative politics based on justice,
recognition and inclusiveness in the Palestinian Israeli struggle.
END Notes
1 Kaldor, Mary. (2001). "Wanted: Global Politics." The Nation. November
5, p.15
2 Bishara, Marwan. (2001). "An Enemy with No Forwarding Address."
Le Monde diplomatique. October, www.monde-diplomatique.fr
3 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. (99). "New
World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century." The Phase I Report
on the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st
Century. Washington: USCNS/21, 15 September, p. 4.
4 "An Enemy with No Forwarding Address." www.monde-diplomatique.fr
5 Rumsfeld, Donald H. (2001). "Beyond This War on Terrorism." The
Washington Post. November 1.
6 Albert, Mathias. (98). "Security as Boundary Function: Changing Identities
and 'Securitization' in World Politics." International Journal of Peace
Studies, 3, 1:23-46
7 "Wanted: Global Politics." P.15
8 The Foreign Policy Interview. (2001). "Reinventing War." Foreign
Policy. November/December, p.34
9 "An Enemy With No Forwarding Address." www.monde-diplomatique.fr
10 Khan, Muqtader. (2001). "Islam: Between Realism and Idealism."
United States Institute of Peace. Part I of the paper delivered at the United
States Institute of Peace on November 7th. p. 2.
11 Ibid., p. 2.
12 Lewis, Bernard. (2001). "The Revolt of Islam." The New Yorker.
November 19, p.62.
13 For an understanding of Violence Theory I have referred to Johan Galtung's
"Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means [The Transcend Method],"
United Nations Disaster Management Training Program, UN, 2000.
14 Bin Laden, Osama. (2001) "Hypocrisy Rears Its Ugly Head." The Washington
Post. Text of Bin Laden's remarks that were aired on Qatar's Al-Jazeera television
on September ?
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid
19 Jensen, Michael. (2001). "Nosedive in Saudi-US Ties." Ahram Weekly.
November 15-21.
20 Scholte, Jan Aart. (2000). "Globalization a critical introduction."
New York: St. Martin's Press, Scholarly and Reference Division, p.226.
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