CONF 702: PEACE STUDIES
Professor Ho-Won Jeong
George Mason University
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
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Nelson Mandela as a Peacemaker
Daniel Liberfeld
Presented at the ISA Convention, March 2002
Scholars have devoted far more attention to the causes of war than to the causes
of peace, possibly because peace has generally been understood as the absence
of war rather than as having its own positive content (Hakvoort & Oppenheimer,
1999: 65). Likewise, studies of exemplary peacemakers are scarcer than studies
of war-making, authoritarian, or genocidal personalities. Leaders' personal
attributes are a proximate rather than an ultimate cause of war or peace. Yet,
just as malevolent leaders, given predisposing structural conditions, can precipitate
war and genocide, individual peacemakers can contribute to the non-violent resolution
of international and civil conflict. Analyzing the attributes of an expert peacemaker
can yield insights into the causes of peace in the same way as understanding
malevolent personalities helps us understand the causes of war. This article
considers Nelson Mandela's accomplishments as a peacemaker and speculates about
the distinctive aspects of Mandela's peacemaking practice, and aspects that
may be representative of accomplished peacemakers generally. It assesses how
Mandela the individual affected the historic process of South Africa's democratic
transition, and briefly discusses the degree to which Mandela's qualities could
be fostered in prospective peacemakers.
The paper distinguishes traits that remained consistent from those that emerged
over the course of Mandela's six decades in politics in order to guard against
the overestimation of cross-situational consistency in personality, and underestimation
of environmental or situational influences (Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Rasler
et al., 1980). The paper argues that during his youth and early political career
Mandela fit the profile of a "pre-takeover revolutionist" (Suedfeld
& Rank, 1976), characterized by undifferentiated thinking and conceptual
simplicity. In a transformation mainly wrought during Mandela's more than 27
years in prison, he evolved into a leader distinguished by a high degree of
cognitive complexity and an inclusive, humanistic, and pragmatic approach to
politics. He was thus able to fulfill the different roles of nationalist leader/competitive
negotiator and of mediator/integrator. High cognitive complexity equipped Mandela,
more so than other revolutionaries, for the transition to post-liberation leader.
As Suedfeld and Rank note,
A government in power must function at a complex level in order to solve the
numerous and complicated problems that confront it. Generally, there is no longer
a single overriding enemy, various factions must be reconciled and conciliated,
policies must be based on diverse considerations in complex interactions, and
both ideology and practice must be flexible and adaptable to dynamic events
(1976: 171-72).
In prison Mandela acted as a quasi-governmental leader-reconciling factions
and developing a capacity for ideological flexibility-for a period far longer
than that during which he was a guerrilla leader.
Some speculation is warranted concerning the degree to which central elements
of Mandela's peacemaking style may be applicable to peacemakers generally. Eminent
peacemakers, be they political leaders of liberation struggles against anti-democratic
regimes-for example, Mohandas Gandhi, Aung San Su Kyi of Burma, or Kim Dae Jung
of South Korea, or politically unaffiliated religious officials engaged in such
struggles, such as Martin Luther King, Desmond Tutu, Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo
of East Timor, or the Dalai Lama, tend to share certain characteristics. First,
they define their political beliefs and objectives in universal, rather than
particularistic or exclusivist, terms. They gain moral legitimacy and worldwide
support for their movements through written and spoken appeals to principles
of universal human rights. Second, they demonstrate their willingness to pay
a high personal price for their beliefs by resisting injustice at the risk of
repression and imprisonment. Third, insofar as figures such as Mandela or Xanana
Gusmao of East Timor resorted to force, they cogently argued that they undertook
sabotage or guerrilla warfare as a last resort, in accord with just-war principles,
having exhausted non-violent options. Fourth, such peacemakers evince an understanding
of the real needs of rival groups, e.g., by defining liberation in terms that
include the oppressor along with the oppressed and advocating reconciliation.
Mandela differs from other iconic peacemakers, such as Tutu or King, in that
he is a partisan politician, at home in the competitive world of bureaucratic
and party politics. And while Gandhi, King, and Tutu mobilized support for liberation
movements on the basis of religion, Mandela was never a prophet, holy man, or,
despite profound personal sacrifice, a religious martyr. Nor is he a pacifist:
Abandoning non-violent protests against apartheid when he judged them ineffective
in 1960 (after the government outlawed the ANC and shot demonstrators at Sharpeville),
he formulated and helped implement a campaign of sabotage and, eventually, guerrilla
warfare. His commitment to "armed struggle" was, however, always contingent
on the possibility of ANC-government negotiations.
Accomplished peacemakers may also differ psychologically, in their interpersonal
styles, and in the particulars of their peacemaking practice. The paper proposes
that an analytic framework for comparative analysis include motivations and
beliefs concerning the self, attitudes toward others, and relevant worldviews
and practices. To analyze Mandela's personal attributes relevant to peacemaking
and negotiation, it adopts the categories used in the personality-at-a-distance
(PAD) methodology by developed by Margaret Hermann and colleagues (e.g., Hermann,
1977, 1987; Winter et al., 1991). These categories help organize politically
relevant elements of personality related to leaders' motivations (need for achievement,
need for affiliation, and need for power); their beliefs (regarding nationalism,
control over events, and self-confidence); and their cognitive and interpersonal
orientations (complexity of thinking, distrust of others, and task versus interpersonal
orientation). Instead, Mandela's autobiography and accounts by colleagues, fellow
prisoners, journalists, and biographers provide data that permit consideration
of Mandela in terms of each of the PAD categories qualitatively, with emphasis
on personality traits relevant to peacemaking.
The PAD measures, which code the content of leaders' spontaneous statements,
pose methodological challenges in that Mandela could not be quoted for long
stretches of his political career, particularly his decades in prison. For this
reason quantitative content analysis is avoided here. Moreover, Mandela's personality
both eludes ready characterization in terms of high or low levels of a given
trait and also comprises traits apparently in tension. For example, he confounds
the PAD category "task versus interpersonal orientation" by being
at once highly task oriented and also solicitous of others. Regarding "belief
in nationalism," he has adhered to both a racially defined African nationalism
and a non-racial, civic nationalism. Since this "both/and" quality
appears to be a key feature of Mandela's personality, the analysis offered here
highlights tensions between ostensibly opposing characteristics.
Achievement Motive
According to George Bizos (1999), Mandela's personal lawyer and a friend since
law school, Mandela, "without saying so, showed every sign, from the early
'50s …that he was a man of destiny." Mandela's sense of destiny for
leadership extends still further back. When he was in his early twenties, he
expressed to a white colleague the conviction that he would one day become prime
minister of South Africa. As the adopted son of the royal family of the Thembu
branch of the Xhosa people, Mandela was groomed to be an advisor to the Thembu
king. The adults in Mandela's early life made clear their high expectations
for him. At court and at boarding-school he absorbed habits of self-discipline,
while tribal culture, including stick fighting and the rigors of adolescent
circumcision rituals among boys, inculcated a stoic attitude toward pain and
deprivation. In his adult life as well he pursued physical fitness through rigorously
health-conscious regimens, and while in prison he rose at 3:30 each morning
to begin the day with two hours of exercise (Bethell, 1986: 192). He was, according
to fellow prisoner Fikile Bam, "a very disciplined person in small things
as in big things…. He was very disciplined in food. He always was wanting
to share his own food with other people, and he never wanted to be given favors,
which other people couldn't have" (1999).
Oliver Tambo (1965) describes Mandela as "passionate, emotional, sensitive,
quickly stung to bitterness and retaliation by insult and patronage." However,
in prison, according to his colleague and fellow prisoner Mac Maharaj, Mandela
made a conscious effort to master anger and impulsiveness (Ottoway, 1993: 47).
He had always admired the imperturbability of his political mentor, Walter Sisulu,
nicknamed "Buddha," who, Mandela notes, "never lost his head
in a crisis; he was often silent when others were shouting…. Sometimes
one can judge an organization by the people who belong to it, and I knew that
I would be proud to belong to any organization in which Walter was a member"
(1994: 83).
Mandela lived in a tiny dank cell for 18 years, and in none of his 27-year imprisonment
did he enjoy any personal privacy: His correspondence was censored and withheld,
his living space monitored, and his conversations recorded. In these circumstances
Mandela became highly adept at physical and emotional self-control.
In prison Mandela enjoyed playing checkers and chess. To the irritation of some
opponents he patiently deliberated the each move's ramifications before acting
(Mandela, 1994: 396-97). Fellow prisoner Neville Alexander recalls,
He would take his time with every move, he would consider it very carefully.
He would sort of mislead the other person by pointing things, this way, that
way, the other and then making the move that wasn't expected.… It was a
war of attrition, and he tended therefore to be victorious in most cases (1999).
Nor, according to Alexander, was Mandela above gloating over an especially
good move. According to Jessie Duarte (1999), Mandela's personal assistant in
the early 1990s, "He would always say that if you want to win a position,
make sure you lay the ground very firmly." Stengel (1999) notes,
In negotiations, in politics, he's enormously patient and part of that comes
from his upbringing as a boy and seeing how the chief listened to what everyone
had to say. In negotiations ... that gave him some leverage, gave him some power,
because his opinion remained a mystery until the last. It seemed more forceful
because he had held it in abeyance until then.
Despite his remarkable self-control and deliberateness, Mandela retains a strong
element of sincerity and spontaneity in his self-presentation. According to
Alexander (1999),
He's a really good actor…. He's a very cerebral person…. I have never
seen him worsted really in a debate. He thinks things through very carefully,
and then the force and the power of his conviction makes him spontaneous....
He is genuine, but it's because it's been thought through very, very carefully.
With Mandela confrontation is a tactic, dictated by a deliberate strategy,
not by emotion, and anger, when expressed, is calculated. Stengel (1999) concludes
that Mandela does harbor "tremendous bitterness" about how he was
treated, but "his great achievement as a leader, is the ability to hide
that bitterness. To show the smiling face of reconciliation, not the frown of
bitterness and lost opportunity." Mandela's greatness stems from this capacity
to make the leap from personal injuries to the self to the dignity and aspirations
of the society as a whole. Early in Mandela's life, a white official deprived
his father of his tribal position and the family's income. After he moved to
segregated Johannesburg, Mandela was motivated to fight white supremacy because
the system threatened to disempower him and limit his own potential accomplishments,
and because it continually affronted his sense of fairness and personal dignity.
He joined the ANC when he saw "that it was not just my freedom that was
curtailed, but the freedom of everyone who looked like I did" (1994: 543).
Mandela, as Stengel (1999) observes, "was able to transfer the personal
to the political…. He managed to, at some point, think about it all in
a larger context…. Even though he so often was personally offended …
he realized it wasn't directed at [him] personally." His achievement motivation,
comprising a sense of destiny for political leadership combined with self-discipline
and stoicism, allowed him to repress personal hurt in service of larger political
goals. Mandela's need for achievement also manifests itself in his competitive
orientation and his persistence and thoroughness of preparation in negotiations.
Affiliation Motive
As he matured, Mandela tempered his competitive orientation so that, while still
seeking victory in politics-as in boxing, tennis, and the other competitive
pursuits he enjoyed-he also prioritized maintaining good relations with his
opponents. In both his personal and political relationships Mandela is notable
for his solicitousness toward others and his ability to establish and maintain
rapport. He enjoys others' company and is outstanding at remembering others'
names and personal details, such as the names of their family members (Sparks,
1995: 47). He is a good listener and observer of people, reflecting the Xhosa
tradition in which children learn by observation and imitation.
In prison, Mandela led the formation of a unified committee among the bitterly
rivalrous ANC, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and Unity Movement prisoners (Bam,
1999). Psychologist Saths Cooper, a leader of the rival Black Consciousness
Movement who shared a cellblock with Mandela for five years, observed that Mandela
was "able to get on with every person he met. He played a vital role in
dampening the conflicts that broke out on [Robben] Island. Despite having ideological
disagreements, he was able to maintain personal contact." A prisoner from
the PAC noted of Mandela, "It doesn't matter if you differ, he is always
polite. He never gets angry. All he will do is try to have the discussion as
amicable as possible" (Koch, 1990). Once a contentious figure in ANC relations
with allied and rival organizations, Mandela became a bridge-builder in "hundreds
of political rows" between ANC prisoners and followers of rival groups
(Ottoway, 1993: 49).
Within the deliberative culture of the ANC, Mandela became a master of what
Fisher and Ury (1981) term "separating the people from the problem."
Besides maintaining personal relations with political rivals, such as chief
Kaiser Matanzima, who became a functionary of the apartheid regime, and attending
to the easily bruised pride of Zulu nationalist Mangosuthu Buthelezi, another
tribal leader who opposed the ANC, Mandela was able to avoid serious schisms
among the ANC leaders in prison. Of Buthelezi, Mandela noted, "He was deprived
of parental love and care, so he grew up with this insecurity…. Once you
understand that, Buthelezi is a very fine person" (Keller, 1994, cited
in Waldmeir, 1998: 159). Mandela thus prioritized showing Buthelezi signs of
affection and approval and wrote him respectful letters from prison, despite
Buthelezi's status within the ANC as a arch-traitor. Immediately after his release
he personally thanked Buthelezi for his support.
His solicitousness regarding relations with political rivals stems in part from
the philosophy of ubuntu, which emphasizes that one's own humanity and identity
derive from relations with other people. Desmond Tutu (1999) observes,
Suffering can do one of two things to a person. It can make you bitter and
hard and really resentful of things. Or, as it seems to do with very many people,
it is like fires of adversity that toughen someone. They make you strong but
paradoxically also they make you compassionate and gentle. I think that that
is what happened to [Mandela]…. It is a deep compassion which includes,
as we have seen, those who have roughed him up. This 'ubuntu' approach that
... ultimately if your humanity, if your personhood is enhanced, mine, ipso
facto, is going to be enhanced as well.
While Mandela seeks to keep rivals close by, rather than allow them to cause
trouble from a distance, the pragmatic aspects of his interpersonal style are
hard to separate from his disposition. According to Tutu (1999),
I genuinely believe his magnanimity, because I would have thought that the
mask would slip and that there could be moments when this is put on. But …
when you mention somebody who is, or you thought was, a political opponent …
and it was a confidential conversation, he would start off looking for the good
points in the other guy.
During their long years in prison, Mandela and other ANC leaders developed
a degree of reciprocity with several of the warders, teaching the young ones
math, history, English, and even elements of their own Afrikaans language. Mandela's
goals extended beyond the imperatives of survival, to treating "the struggle
in prison as a microcosm of the struggle as a whole" and using black prisoners'
relations with conservative white warders as a laboratory for re-negotiating
race relations on a basis of mutual respect (1994: 341).
To this end Mandela learned the language of the Afrikaners (the mainly Dutch
descended whites who dominated politics after 1948), and in his contacts with
government representatives consciously sought to reassure them, while not budging
from the ANC's core demands, its sanctions campaign, or its alliance with the
South African Communist Party (SACP). According to a minister in the apartheid
government who met several times with Mandela in prison, "The ANC's reasonableness
and lack of bitterness came across. It was clear that their priority was not
to destroy their opponent" (Viljoen, 1994).
Mandela's humane spirit was reflected in his willingness to care for fellow
prisoners when they were sick, and even to clean their toilet buckets (Benson,
1990). His altruism was also pragmatic since relationships and mutual support
networks were critical in resisting systematic oppression in prison. As Mandela
notes (1994: 390),
It would be very hard if not impossible for one man alone to resist… But
the authorities' greatest mistake was keeping us together…. We supported
each other and gained strength from each other. Whatever we knew, whatever we
learned, we shared, and by sharing we multiplied whatever courage we had individually.
Despite his sociability, Mandela also dedicates himself to solitary activities
(e.g., long-distance running as a youth, gardening in prison, and early-morning
walks after his release). He notes, "Although I am a gregarious person,
I love solitude even more" (1994: 232). Nor does he easily reveal emotion
or private feelings. According to longtime friend Amina Cachalia (1999),
There's a wall that he's built between him and everybody. Sometimes he lets
slip something along the way, but in most cases he's so controlled about his
feelings that it's difficult to penetrate that wall…. He can joke and be
just like ordinary people are, and yet, when it comes to a very personal thing,
one would imagine that with your friends, or with your very close relation,
you would let go…. But he doesn't.
Power Motive
Mandela asserts, "My final commitment is to liberation, not power"
(quoted in Villa-Vicencio, 1996: 157). In assessing his need for power it is
important to distinguish between power accruing to the individual and the goal
of power or equal status for Africans as a group. Politics for him is primarily
a means to social justice, not to power itself.
Given his position in the ANC, Mandela knew that he would play an important
role in South Africa's liberation struggle but, according to Bam (1999), "he
had no personal ambitions of power." Duarte notes that, despite his celebrity,
Mandela "wasn't spoiled by adoration, because he didn't see himself as
being the one who was being adored. He understood himself as being the [ANC's]
representative" (1999). In meetings with visitors in prison "he was
at pains to point out that his own authority derived solely from his position
within the organization, and in so far as he was able to reflect the popular
will" (Commonwealth Group, 1986: 68).
Mandela also refused to use positions of responsibility to exempt himself from
the obligations of those under him (e.g., when he was a prefect at boarding
school-see Mandela, 1994: 34). Duarte (1999) observes,
He never really cared about what great big people think of him, but he did
care about what small people thought of him…. He didn't mind if he insulted
a very important person, or said something to them that was unkind, because
he said they could fend and fight for themselves. But he would never insult
someone who did not have power, who did not have an ability to defend themselves.
He was a great champion of the underdogs.
Mandela, according to Bizos (1999), "is not an egotist. I have hardly
ever heard him, when discussing political matters, to say 'I.' It is always
'we' or 'my organization,' or 'the liberation movement.'" Mandela calls
himself "an ordinary man who became a leader because of extraordinary circumstances"
(1994: 493). However, at several key junctures Mandela distinguished himself
by challenging authority figures when it seemed to him that authority was being
exercised unjustly. In secondary school, he resigned as a student representative
in solidarity with a student protest and "chose" expulsion rather
than accede to the headmaster's demand that he rescind his resignation. Within
the ANC he has been both a staunch party loyalist and, crucially, willing to
take initiatives that contravened party policy. He was "a good organization
man" (Ottoway, 1993: 161) who suppressed his own preferences when overruled.
Nonetheless, in 1949 Mandela led the ANC Youth League in ousting an inactive
ANC president. And while in prison, he transgressed organizational norms of
consultation and authorization by engaging independently in secret talks with
the government while only minimally informing the ANC leadership. (Mandela sought
to make dialogue a fait accompli before it could be vetoed by ANC colleagues
[1994: 458]).
As Walter Sisulu observes (1999), Mandela's willingness to risk his power through
non-consultation "had the possibility of undermining his leadership."
Mandela's initiative provides an interesting counterpoint to his dictum, absorbed
from the Thembu regent, that "a leader is like a shepherd. He stays behind
the flock, letting the most nimble go on ahead, whereupon the others follow,
not realizing that they are being directed from behind" (1994: 19). Instead,
Mandela asserts, "There are times when a leader must move out ahead of
the flock, off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the
right way" (1994: 458-59). Leaders are thus obliged to direct the masses,
while also responding to their needs and preferences:
Leaders are important but history is ultimately not made by kings and generals.
It is made by the masses…. If a leader ignores the masses he or she is
ultimately compelled to resort to tyranny to remain in power. Leaders at the
same time have an obligation to lead; they are required to move their people
forward, from where they are at a given time, to where they are required to
be (quoted in Villa Vicencio, 1996: 150).
Likewise, regarding the ANC, "Sometimes one must go public with an idea
to push a reluctant organization in the direction you want it to go."
As an ANC activist and in negotiations with government officials, Mandela's
focus was equal rights and political participation for Africans. Since he identifies
with those who are vulnerable and is not motivated by desire for personal wealth
or power, he is incorruptible.
Belief in Nationalism
Mandela's transcendence of his tribal nationalism is a central theme in his
autobiography. At the "Rivonia trial" he testified about hearing stories
as a youth in which "the names of Dingane and Bambatha, Hintsa and Makanna,
Squngthi and Dalasile, Moshoeshoe and Sekhukhuni, were praised as the pride
and glory of the entire African nation" (1994: 317). Initially a Xhosa
nationalist, he became an ardent African nationalist, and eventually a proponent
of non-racial nationalism. His cosmopolitanism, grew as he formed relationships
with non-Xhosa Africans at boarding school, and then with non-Africans. From
the time he arrived as the only black law student at Johannesburg's University
of the Witwatersrand, Mandela was personally close to individuals from all of
South Africa's diverse racial ethnic backgrounds, showing "no apparent
discrimination, whatsoever" in his friendships (Sampson, 1999). He worked
in predominantly white law offices for twelve years before establishing his
own firm in 1952. Yet throughout this period Mandela's Xhosa identity remained
prominent. According to Bam (1999), he was "a representative of Xhosa-speaking
people in Johannesburg, where we were really a minority group in those years."
During his twenties and early thirties Mandela's belief in racially based African
nationalism empowered him to combat white supremacist institutions and practices.
The 1952 Defiance Campaign, in which South African whites, Indians, and Coloureds
(of mixed racial heritage) participated, marked a turning point: The evident
willingness of non-Africans to sacrifice for the cause of racial equality convinced
Mandela that a non-racial South Africa was preferable to an exclusively African
one, and that Africans needed non-African allies to achieve liberation. Despite
his abandonment of parochial ethnic nationalism, Mandela felt, on leaving South
Africa in 1962, that in black-ruled Africa, "For the first time in my life,
I was a free man … truly home for the first time" (1994: 253). Alexander
(1999) recalls a debate among prisoners in which Mandela declared that African
people's nationhood was for him "an unquestionable assumption." However,
Mandela's autobiography traces the evolution of his self-critical awareness
of his own nationalistic and ethnocentric tendencies (e.g., 1994: 260).
While seeking to end chauvinistic nationalism and racial prejudice, Mandela
understands Afrikaners' nationalism and identity based fears. In prison his
far-sighted conclusion that negotiations with the Afrikaner dominated government
were inevitable prompted him to learn Afrikaans, which Africans typically considered
the language of oppression. He persuaded some dubious ANC comrades to do likewise
because
We are in for a protracted war, which is going to be a combination of armed
and political struggle…. [T]o wage it, you must understand the mind of
the opposing commander. You can never outmaneuver him unless you understand
him, and you can't understand him unless you understand his literature and language
(quoted in Waldmeir, 1998: 16).
Accordingly, Mandela
put a lot of work and effort in learning to speak Afrikaans and to use it....
He had absolutely no qualms about greeting people in Afrikaans, and about trying
his Afrikaans out on the warders.… He wanted to really get to know Afrikaners,
as part of the people who belonged to the country [and because] … whatever
solution there was going to be on the political issues was going to involve
Afrikaans people (Bam, 1999).
During secret talks with the government, Mandela reassured Niel Barnard, the
nationalistic head of state intelligence, by greeting him in Afrikaans and allowing
Barnard to speak Afrikaans during their meetings. Minister of Justice Kobie
Coetsee, who also participated in the meetings, recalled that Mandela knew "more
about Afrikaners' history than many Afrikaners themselves" (Meredith, 1999:
373).
After his release from prison Mandela prioritized reconciliation and "binding
the wounds of the country." As president he made his non-racialist outlook
consistent with his political practice, forming the first integrated cabinet,
and becoming a preeminent symbol of racial reconciliation. Pragmatically, he
recognized that Afrikaners could sabotage any solution from which they felt
excluded.
Mandela's dramatic appearance at the 1999 Rugby World Cup finals wearing the
jersey of South Africa's national team-which had long been identified with racist
Afrikaner nationalism, was part of a strategy of nation-building aimed at getting
the "white" rugby team accepted by the black majority (and making
the soccer team a national, not merely "black," team). When South
Africa won the championship, Mandela "said it was one of the happiest moments
of his life.... It was the country's moment in history that would unite every
South African" (Duarte, 1999).
Belief in Ability to Control Events
Mandela's legal practice, and, especially, his prison experience reinforced
his sense of the efficacy of persuasive argument and dialogue. Despite facing
repression and an extreme external locus of control in prison, his belief in
his ability to influence his own fate and South Africa's remained strong.
Mandela gained early experience in dialogue and debate from his observations
of the petitions and councils at the Thembu court. He developed his rhetorical
skills at school, as a lawyer, and as a political leader. Organizing mass defiance
of apartheid produced a sense of agency that overcame his sense of disempowerment
as an African. African nationalism and political activism transformed Mandela
from a youth who was awed by white shopkeepers and freed him
from any lingering sense of doubt or inferiority I might still have felt; it
liberated me from the feeling of being overwhelmed by the power and seeming
invincibility of the white man and his institutions.… [N]ow the white man
had felt the power of my punches and I could walk upright like a man, and look
everyone in the eye with the dignity that comes from not having succumbed to
oppression and fear (1994: 122).
During his legal trials and in prison, situations in which his adversaries
could more easily set the terms of struggle, Mandela found ways to take a large
measure of control-notably, by turning his speech from the dock at the Rivonia
trial into an indictment of apartheid. With life in prison defined by loss of
control, he marshaled a complete effort to restore his sense of autonomy and
agency. His efforts ranged from growing vegetables in the island's rocky soil
to leading slowdowns that forced warders to reduce work quotas (1994: 338).
Mandela also spent many hours each week helping prisoners with judicial appeals,
noting, "Prison is contrived to make one feel powerless, and this was one
of the few ways to move the system" (1994:408).
Mandela's philosophy, which he admitted was not easy to apply, was always to
keep the long-term goals in sight and not to worry about what one could not
control. [[source]]. This approach enabled him to persist in the struggle for
improvements in prison conditions despite many setbacks. Getting African prisoners
issued long trousers, for example, took three years (Mandela, 1994: 451). Alexander
recalls Mandela advocating that the prisoners think strategically about how
to gain control over their lives on Robben Island: "That instead of being
reactive all the time, we could begin to be proactive. We could begin to create
a new paradigm ... within which to restructure our existence on the island"
(1999). Envisioning an eventual victory was essential in prison with a life
sentence, Bam notes,
It was, in fact, a condition of our survival in prison to believe that we would
win. The struggle would be successful in the end. We'd be out of prison during
our lifetime. This is a theme which ran through every little speech that was
made [at] any formal or an informal gathering, that we were going to get freedom
during our lifetime. Nelson actually lived that belief more than anyone else
I knew (1999; see also Mandela, 1994: 341).
Since he had good reason for confidence in his persuasive skills and the morality
of his cause, he sought to engage adversaries in dialogue and lead them into
cooperative relations. A fellow prisoner recalls, "You cannot really call
it a debate to discuss issues with Mandela. Whatever you believed, you would
eventually find yourself nodding your head and agreeing" (Koch, 1990).
Mandela notes that he and his fellow ANC prisoners
adopted a policy of talking to the warders and persuading them to treat us
as human beings. And a lot of them did, and there were lots of things we could
talk about. And the lesson was that one of our strongest weapons is dialogue.
Sit down with a man, if you have prepared your case very well, that man, after
he has sat down to talk to you, will never be the same again (quoted in Waldmeir,
1998: 17).
Mandela's sense of self-efficacy is significant in terms of his accession to
political leadership and his sustained attempt in prison to transform African-Afrikaner
relations. Further, sense of efficacy is closely related to a negotiator's willingness
to persist in efforts to reach agreement despite impasses and negative feedback
(O'Connor & Arnold, 2002). Mandela's sense of efficacy sustained his persistent
effort to engage government officials in pre-negotiation dialogue during the
1985-1990 period, despite frequent unresponsiveness from government officials
and ambivalence among ANC colleagues.
Self-confidence
When equated with "self-importance" (Hermann, 1987: 167), Mandela's
characteristic self-confidence appears paradoxical in that he displays both
self-confidence bordering on arrogance, and also remarkable humility-considering
his status as one of the most admired political figures of the twentieth century.
He is not self-absorbed or megalomaniacal, and is self-confident enough to laugh
at his own foibles. His self-assurance is rooted in the hugely supportive family
environment in which he was raised. He benefited from his mother's unconditional
love and from an extended family of surrogate parents following the death of
his father when Mandela was nine and his subsequent adoption by the Thembu regent.
Mandela's autobiography shows a mature perspective on his personal and emotional
evolution. He writes with self-deprecating humor about his misadventures in
romance, deficiencies as a scholar, and lack of sophistication as a country
youth in Johannesburg. Originally "a bit stuck up," he learned at
boarding school that he had to make his way "on the basis of my ability,
not my heritage" (1994: 33). Tribal political culture provided that chiefs
could be criticized and even satirized and, while Mandela values his sense of
dignity above all else, his ego tolerated jokes at his own expense (e.g., his
son's humorous deprecation of Mandela's boxing abilities [1994: 168]).
Self-confidence was apparent in the pride Mandela took in his own appearance
and his "pleasure in dressing immaculately and appropriately" (Benson,
1990). Adelaide Tambo (1999) recalls him as, "Without doubt one of the
best dressed men in South Africa." Perhaps more importantly, his self-confidence
is manifest in his capacity for self-criticism and his interest in learning
from mistakes. As President, he convened his private secretaries at the end
of the day, and asked them to "tell me what I have done wrong today, because
I don't want to make the same mistakes tomorrow" (Brink, 1999).
Stengel (1999) attributes Mandela's courage at the Rivonia trial-in overruling
his lawyers and declaring that democratic and free society was an ideal for
which he was prepared to die-to Mandela's self-confidence:
One of the things that separates Mandela from other people, and even from the
other Rivonia trialists, is that he's an optimist. He's a cockeyed optimist….
He never ever really thought that they might be executed. And the little bit
of recklessness he used in the final paragraph of the speech, was in part because
he thought, "I am thumbing my nose at you. I know you are not going to
kill me. I'm indestructible" (see also Mandela, 1994: 341-2).
After visiting Mandela in 1986, parliamentarian Helen Suzman noted, "There
was nothing deferential in his relationship with the prison authorities. I had
noticed this remarkable self-assurance at our first meeting in 1967. My original
impression was unchanged" (1993: 155). Coetsee recalls his first meeting
with Mandela in 1985, while Mandela was hospitalized as
quite incredible. He acted as though we had known each other for years, and
this was the umpteenth time we had met. He introduced [Chief of Prisons] General
Willemse and me to the two nurses and chided me for not coming to see him sooner.
I remember he made a little joke about this being his ward and me being his
warder. He took complete command of the situation. He was like the host. He
invited us to sit down, and "General Willemse, are you comfortable and
is there anything we can do for you?" (Sparks, 1995: 24).
As Stengel (1999) notes, Mandela's self-confidence, like his sense of self-efficacy,
enabled him to negotiate with prison authorities over parochial grievances and
later to engage the government in political dialogue:
from the very beginning, when he started talking to the authorities about whether
they would have long pants or short pants, whether they would have hot food
or cold food, he got in the habit and the knowledge of negotiating with the
enemy. He was very at ease with that. He was very at ease talking with commissioners,
with the police, and in a way that groomed him for those later negotiations.
It made him feel, "This is a boxing match that I know how to handle. I
know how to fight against these fellows. I know how they feint, I know how they
move, and I feel confident in this arena."
Mandela sought talks with high government officials certain that if they met
with him, "we could discuss our little problems and I am sure we could
convince them" (quoted in Bethell, 1986: 195). For Stengel (1999),
The secret talks show his incredible self-confidence, and his confidence that,
"I, Nelson Mandela, can do this, in a way that no one else can." In
a way, if you are going to criticize his leadership, it might be for something
like that, to say that only he can do it, and no one else.
Indeed, Mandela's self-confidence in initiating talks without a broader organizational
mandate drew some charges of elitist flouting of the culture of consultation
and decentralized decisionmaking in the mid-1980s democratic movement.
On the other hand, Sisulu (1999) characterized Mandela's initiative as "one
of the most outstanding courageous moments when a man is alone in the face of
that situation, particularly in politics where you have got a lot of criticism
from everyone. He was confident of what line he was following." So confident
was Mandela that throughout years of discussions with a team of senior government
officials intent on co-opting him he never compromised on key principals including
majority rule, the ANC-SACP alliance, and the need to retain the option of "armed
struggle."
Conceptual /Cognitive Complexity
Cognitive or conceptual complexity is the ability to analyze people, groups,
policies, and ideas in differentiated terms and, conversely, disinclination
to monolithic views and interpretations (Hermann, 1987: 167). It is associated
with tolerance for ambiguity, adaptable, non-dogmatic approaches to political
practice and ideology, and a capacity for understanding conflict from multiple
perspectives.
As a young man, Mandela was drawn to exclusive African nationalism because,
as he writes, "I was angry at the white man, not at racism" (1994:
98). During his twenties he began to emerge as a more open-minded and flexible
thinker capable of adjusting his beliefs in light of new or dissonant information.
For example, observing the Indian community's mobilization in 1946 against racially
discriminatory laws passed by the Smuts government convinced Mandela that South
Africans of Indian heritage could be allies in the liberation struggle and helped
convert him to a non-racial nationalism (1994: 90). His capacity to understand
Afrikaners' narrow ethnic nationalism, despite no longer adhering to ethnic
nationalism himself, enabled him to empathize with his adversaries for purposes
of strategic analysis. This meant emphasizing ANC recognition of Afrikaners'
indigenousness and acceptance of their desire for cultural autonomy.
Mandela's extensive reading in biography, history, politics, law, and South
Africa's pre-colonial and colonial-era oral poetry tradition allowed him to
situate South Africa's conflict in global and historical perspective. About
his prison debates with ideological adversaries Neville Alexander and Fikile
Bam, he comments, "intellectually those fellows enriched me" (quoted
in Villa-Vicencio, 1996: 150). Mandela's non-dogmatic approach to politics is
manifest in his tolerance for disparate ideologies and practices. He concludes
(1994: [[PAGE]]) that "in my search for a political formula, I should be
absolutely impartial and objective…. I must leave myself free to borrow
the best from the West and from the East."
Mandela's eclecticism is also evident in his religious belief and practice.
Educated in Protestant missionary schools and still regarding himself as a member
of the Methodist Church into which his mother introduced him, he nevertheless
"never missed a service" by any of the various Catholic, Hindu, Muslim,
and Dutch Reformed Church officials who visited Robben Island (Meredith, 1999:
316; also Mandela, 1994: 393-95). Nor does he disdain tribal ritual and belief.
Mandela highlights commonalities among the central tenets of the world's religions,
and notes, with respect to Islam, "It was an enriching experience for me
to gain a deeper knowledge of a religion other than my own" (quoted in
Villa-Vicencio, 1996: 147-48).
Besides diverse spiritual and intellectual influences, Mandela can draw on his
own experience encompassing rural and urban society, and poverty and privilege.
His aristocratic upbringing is balanced by a "common touch" and a
first-hand knowledge of hunger acquired in Alexandra township where, as a student
and legal apprentice he looked forward to one hot meal a week-a handout from
his landlord. While in hiding from security forces, Mandela impersonated an
uneducated laborer so effectively that not even his African co-workers suspected
his real identity (1994: 243-44).
Stengel (1999) credits the prison experience with heightening Mandela's ability
to see the world in differentiated, complex terms:
There were so many times when I was ... interviewing him, and in effect his
answer was, 'both.' It's never just one reason, or this or that reason. It's
always some combination, and what happened to him on [Robben] Island, in a way,
is that he began to see things in the round, in three dimensions…. Nobody
is all good or all evil. Nobody operates purely out of selfish motives, or purely
out of unselfish motives. It gave him a more rounded view of humanity and life.
That ... is his maturity-that he sees things from both sides.
Distrust of Others
Mandela holds a fundamentally optimistic view of human nature and is disinclined
to suspect others' motives. The capacity for empathic goodwill that inspired
poet Seamus Heaney (2001) to call him "an artist of human possibility"-is
strikingly evident in Mandela's ability to forgive others, even abusive racists.
When Colonel Badenhorst, "the most callous and barbaric commanding officer
we had had on Robben Island," was transferred (due to Mandela's alerting
officials from the outside to the warden's methods), Badenhorst unexpectedly
and respectfully wished the political prisoners good luck. "That day, he
had revealed that there was another side to his nature," Mandela writes.
"It was a useful reminder that all men, even the most seemingly cold-blooded,
have a core of decency, and that if their heart is touched, they are capable
of changing" (1994: 448).
The apparent absence of bitterness that is often cited as "the most extraordinary
thing about Mandela" (Ottoway, 1993: 48) may be linked with his capacity
to focus on individuals' potential instead of their deficits (together with
the fact that he was not physically brutalized to the extent that many other
prisoners were). He notes that the warders who treated him humanely "reinforced
my belief in the essential humanity even of those who had kept me behind bars
for … twenty-seven and a half years" (1994: 490). He kept in contact
with some former warders after his release, remarking of one "I enjoyed
a most pleasant relationship with that fellow. He was without any racial or
other prejudices. Just a good human being" (quoted in Villa-Vicencio, 1996:
150).
Mandela's optimistic view of human nature reinforced his conviction that even
racists were educable. He was always aware of how isolated whites were and that
they tended to know blacks only as servants. According to Sisulu (1994), Mandela
continually sought to educate government representatives, not only regarding
the ANC's pacific history and goals, but about how to talk with African people
as fellow human beings.
Mandela is neither vindictive nor prone to making definitive moral judgments
toward others, although he can be very cold toward anyone he believes has betrayed
him and is willing to risk personal relationships for important political principals
or goals. Bizos (1999) concurs that Mandela "believes that everybody is
a good guy. Only when people show that they are not on the level with him, he
becomes very angry and can become quite scathing." According to Bam (1999),
he was really very slow to judge people. On the other hand, once he had the
facts and had made up his mind that people were cheating, or people were being
rude to him, he then really never pretended. I can remember one or two people
whom he stopped greeting, which was really sort of the ultimate end on his part.
Then you knew that that person had it. Once he took that stance, it was quite
difficult to change him around.
During his period of underground activity Mandela needed to be canny about
spotting informants and agents of the security police. Of life underground,
he observes,
One has to plan every action, however small and seemingly insignificant….
You cannot be yourself, you must finally inhabit whatever role you have assumed.
In some ways this is not much of an adaptation for a black man in South Africa.
To be a black man in South Africa meant not to trust anything, which was not
unlike being underground for one's entire life (1994: 232).
However, he was probably captured because of insufficient mistrust (1994: 278).
Bam notes that in prison,
He could never … detect who among us had been a plant. You had to actually
come with evidence and … even after that, it would take him quite a while
to be cautious towards a person whom we discovered to be an informer in our
group.… His assessment of people was not particularly sharp or good. He
tended to trust people too much (1999).
Nevertheless, Mandela believed that this trusting attitude actually influenced
others to behave more forthrightly. And Stengel concludes that Mandela's propensity
to trust served him and the country well in the task of achieving a negotiated
settlement:
His flaws were exactly the right flaws for that time, of being too trusting,
of seeing the glasses half-full. That's what South Africa needed at that time.
The man who'd been the leader of the underground movement, the firebrand who
actually is too trusting, who errs on the side of thinking we are men of goodwill,
[that] you are acting out of good motives just as I am. Those are kind of Christ-like
qualities that he has, that he isn't able to see bad motives in people….
[H]e is liable to trust people that he shouldn't trust….. But that's the
sin of a great man. And that's the flaw you want in a great man ... particularly
at this time (1999).
Task vs. Interpersonal Orientation
In terms of his task orientation, defined as "a relative emphasis in interactions
with others on getting the task done as opposed to focusing on the feelings
and needs of others" (Hermann, 1987: 167), Mandela is both highly focused
and dedicated to accomplishing tasks, and also able to accommodate others' feelings.
Duarte (1999) observes,
He didn't ever want to hurt people's feelings. He was always concerned….
He
has a talent to allow people to vent their anger, to put across their emotional
perspective, and finally he'll pin them down on the content issue: "The
real bottom line issue that we need to discuss here is not you, your anger,
where you come from, but where we all going to." His focus would be absolute
on those issues. His ability was purely based on focus. He would ... very calmly
allow you to get very angry … and then at the end he would say, "But
don't you think that the focus of where we have to go, is X?" It was always
succinct. It was always clear. He never is muddled in his head about what he
wants. He knows exactly.
Mandela's stoicism and emotional distance co-exist with a robust capacity for
humor and enjoyment. He is fond of classical music and swing-era jazz and sang
tenor in a prison quartet. His strong interpersonal orientation is evident in
his camaraderie with fellow prisoners, his prodigious memory for others' names
and circumstances, and his consistent ability to forge interpersonal bonds.
Alexander (1999), who often disagreed with Mandela politically, was nonetheless
impressed mainly by the warmth and the genuine interest, which was a feature
that, subsequently I discovered, is very much part of the man and something
which I also must admit now, I learned from him ... to give your full attention
to your interlocutor, and really take notice of what people are saying, listen
to them carefully. In his case, there was a spontaneous, charismatic exuding
of warmth.
After playing Creon in a prison production of Antigone he concluded, "obligations
to the people take precedence over loyalty to an individual" (1994: 397).
Mandela's commitment to the liberation struggle entailed the loss of his family
life: Even years before he went to prison he recalls his son asking "Where
does Daddy live?" (1994: 104). The breakup of his first and second marriages
were at least indirectly due to his political activities. His son who, like
his other children, resented Mandela's absence, died in a car accident while
Mandela was in prison without their having reconciled. Like Gandhi and like
Martin Luther King, he faced threats of death and showed great personal courage
in confronting repressive violence, and suffered when his family was attacked.
Contributions to Historic Processes
In assessing the contributions of individual leaders, Dankwart Rustow (1970:
21) advocates focusing on processes of accession to leadership so as to avoid
two fallacies:
The first is the view that the leader was indispensable to the results being
obtained-leading to the inference, for example, that if Mustafa Kemal had been
killed by a bullet at Gallipoli, there would have been no Turkish nation-state.
The second is the opposite view, that the result was inevitable, that any other
leader would have had to adopt the very same course.
Structural factors in South Africa molded a stalemate in which neither the
apartheid government nor the black liberation forces could prevail unilaterally,
thus narrowing the scope for individual personalities to influence the course
of the conflict. However, the conflict would have been far more prolonged and
destructive had not Afrikaner elites believed that a negotiated settlement with
the African National Congress (ANC) would ultimately enhance their own security,
rather than threaten it (Lieberfeld, 1999, 2000). The conflict's relatively
peaceful outcome is attributable not only to the balance of demographic, economic,
military, political, and diplomatic pressures, but also to micro-interactions
among individuals, such as dialogues that Mandela and other ANC leaders undertook
to reassure white elites that ANC leaders were not vengeful or committed to
their destruction (Lieberfeld, 2002).
Mandela's politics had much in common with that of other major ANC leaders such
as Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo who, however, recognized him as primus inter
pares (Tambo, 1999). What distinguishes Mandela from even these close colleagues
are his charismatic qualities, including his authoritative bearing and physical
presence, sense of humor, interpersonal skills, and relative ease in public
speaking, as well as his belief in the necessity and possibility of achieving
ANC goals through negotiation when fellow ANC leaders opposed negotiation initiatives
on tactical or strategic grounds. Mandela was not alone responsible for the
initiation of a negotiated settlement of the conflict in South Africa: His prison
talks with officials of the governing National party overlapped other "talks
about talks" launched by Tambo and Thabo Mbeki, leaders of the ANC in exile
in Zambia and London (Sparks, 1995). However, ahead of virtually all his colleagues
Mandela judged the moment right for, and pursued, direct government-ANC negotiation.
His pre-negotiation overtures in late 1985 preceded those of the exile leadership
by about two years. Even as structurally oriented a thinker as Communist leader
Joe Slovo acknowledged that "without Mandela, South African history would
have taken a completely different turn," and trade unionist and ANC negotiator
Cyril Ramaphosa concluded that without Mandela negotiations would never have
succeeded (Karis, forthcoming).
Due to his national stature, authoritative bearing, and penchant for forthright
outspokenness on politically difficult issues, Mandela was perhaps uniquely
positioned to articulate the necessity for compromise with the enemy and other
hard truths of the negotiated transition to democracy, and to lead reconciliation
efforts during the transition to democracy-appealing to black South Africans
for patience, for example, after a white assassin killed black ANC hero Chris
Hani in 1993 (Mandela, 1994: 530). As head of state, Mandela gracefully built
bridges to whites, particularly Afrikaners, who had implemented and benefited
most from apartheid. Thus, while his values reflected those of the ANC generally,
he was particularly suited, dispositionally and politically, to undertake peacemaking
initiatives and to oversee their implementation.
Approach to Peacemaking and Negotiation
The preceding sections suggest which aspects of Mandela's personality, interpersonal
style, and political outlook distinguish him as a peacemaker and political leader.
His sense of destiny for leadership and ability to take a lead role in negotiation
initiatives stem from his achievement motivation and high degree of self-confidence.
His ability to maintain good personal relations within his organization, as
well as with leaders of rival organizations, reflects his need for affiliation
in conjunction with his interpersonal orientation and skills. He is incorruptible
since his need for power applies to participatory democratic politics, not personal
power.
Mandela's own residual belief in ethnic nationalism enables him to understand
Afrikaners' ethnic nationalism, while transcending it in his political vision.
His willingness to initiate and persist in difficult negotiations reflects his
sense of control over events. His self-confidence likewise allows him to pursue
high-stakes, independent negotiation initiatives. Cognitively, Mandela's high
capacity for complexity rejects ideological rigidity and affords him an appreciation
of others' worldviews and essential commonalities, a perspective reinforced
by his low level of distrust.
As discussed, Mandela's characteristics are typically more complex and ambivalent
than they appear at first glance. Despite his sense of destiny for leadership,
he is mildly insecure and neither arrogant nor self-important. Essentially self-confident
and convinced of his ability to control events, he is able to tolerate lack
of control.
Regarding others, Mandela is trusting and disposed to believe in even adversaries'
essential humanity and potential for honorable behavior; however, he strategically
deploys his highly controlled self-presentation and is not naïve. He is
a master of interpersonal rapport and solicitous of others' feelings and needs
for emotional expression, while also competitive, goal oriented, and task focused.
Sociably inclined, he is also given to solitary activities and unrevealing of
his deeper emotions.
In his political outlook Mandela is a civic, non-racial nationalist who retains
African nationalist beliefs. His high degree of cognitive complexity is reflected
in his embrace of a range of seemingly contradictory ideologies and practices-e.g.,
socialism and capitalism, liberal democracy and hereditary tribal rule, and
guerrilla warfare and Gandhian non-violence-as well as in his pragmatism.
These characteristics, which make Mandela challenging to categorize in terms
of the PAD methodology, are reflected in his incongruous roles as mediator/bridge-builder
on the one hand, and politician/competitive negotiator on the other. Certain
of Mandela's traits indicate a cooperative and integrative orientation: low
interest in personal power and sympathy for the less powerful, interpersonal
emphasis, low egocentrism, high trust in others, tolerance for lack of control,
incorruptibility, cognitive complexity, and civic nationalism. In terms of overall
leadership type, Mandela seems to meet most of Hermann's (1987) criteria for
"mediator/integrator," save for his high degree of self-confidence
and his high task-orientation which, as noted above, does not signify a deficit
of interpersonal orientation. (He also closely fits the profile of Hermann's
"influential" type, perhaps explicable in view of his early training
for a counselor role to the tribal leadership, as well as the "active independent"
type, assuming his task orientation and nationalism are considered high, as
they plausibly might be.)
Mandela thus possesses the qualities that Boulie (1996) identifies with effective
mediators: empathetic, non-judgmental, patient, persuasive, optimistic, persistent,
trustworthy, intelligent, creative, flexible, commonsensical, and good humored.
His restrained philosophy of leadership and preference for consensus-based solutions
derives from the tribal culture and practices of the Thembu, as well as from
his pragmatic recognition that internal schisms and external rivals could harm
the ANC. Mandela's autobiography also conveys a retrospective understanding
that at various critical junctures-e.g., in his conflicts with the Thembu regent
and with the university official who expelled him-he had, in his impetuousness,
left potential compromises unexplored.
By contrast, others among Mandela's characteristics indicate a competitive or
positional negotiator, or a political mobilizer: e.g., assuming a leadership
role in a nationalist cause defined partly in racial terms, emotional control,
task emphasis, high self-confidence and sense of destiny, strategic planning
and goal-orientation, belief in control over events, personal charisma, and
competitive orientation. His success in using slowdowns to combat work quotas
on Robben Island convinced Mandela of the virtues of standing fast in dealings
with Afrikaners (Ottoway, 1993: 48), and the psychological profiles of Mandela
prepared by corrections officials and psychologists evince distress and amazement
that "he never seemed to give an inch throughout those years" (Sampson,
1999). Once engaged in negotiations Mandela displayed characteristic patience,
tenacity, and tough yet pragmatic bargaining. While capable of powerful conciliatory
gestures, he adopted a positional approach to bargaining with then-President
F. W. de Klerk in negotiations leading up to the 1994 elections. His refusal
to give ground impressed even veteran negotiator Ramaphosa, who considered Mandela
a very stubborn man [with] nerves of steel. Once he has decided that a particular
issue has to be pursued, everything else matters very little. And he can be
very harsh when dealing with an opponent who is unreasonable, very brutal in
a calm and collected sort of way (quoted in Waldmeir, 1998: 202-03).
The traits that make Mandela an effective mediator/integrator-such as skills
in listening and observation, expertise in debate and persuasion, planning and
preparation abilities, analytic skills and cognitive complexity, self-control
and self-confidence, patience and persistence, insight into others' needs and
feelings, personal integrity and reputation, and ability to win others' confidence
and respect-also make him a formidable positional negotiator, particularly when
combined with his competitive orientation and capacity for tactical use of emotions.
(His predisposition to trust others may, however, constitute a liability in
negotiations.) Table I contrasts Mandela's traits in terms of mediator and negotiator
roles.
Mandela's collaborator on his autobiography comments, "All statements about
him worked both ways. Every positive statement has its negative; every negative
statement has its positive" (Stengel, 1999). The keys to Mandela's character
and peacemaking success are his "both/and" qualities, just as the
key to his successful transition from freedom fighter to post-liberation leader
of a still racially divided society is his ability to fill both the competitive
negotiator and integrative mediator roles. Cognitive complexity allows pride
in his own group to coexist with empathic understanding of the adversary group.
Having studied Afrikaners' history, language, and literature, he can acknowledge
and respond constructively to the adversary's perspective, while not subscribing
to it. Belief that his adversaries and he share much in common dispositionally
motivates him to expend efforts in creating interpersonal rapport, to pursue
persuasive argument and continually explain the reasons for his positions, using
analogies that appeal to the other's experience.
Mandela's wide reading in history and law also affords him a capacity for analytic
empathy-the ability to see the adversary in a differentiated perspective, and
to note the constraints on the adversary leadership imposed by its own internal
political competition. For example, he understood that President P. W. Botha's
public statement requiring Mandela to renounce violence before he could be released
had created a new obstacle, since Botha would only appear weak to the rival
Conservative party if he subsequently released Mandela unconditionally. Recalling
Sun Tzu, whose fourth century B.C.E. The Art of War he had studied, Mandela
noted, "I was confident that the enemy itself wanted a retreat, through
a silver bridge" (Sampson, 1999b: 341).
Cognitive complexity allows Mandela to disagree with adversaries while acknowledging
reality of their fears and necessity of addressing them. While not retreating
from core ANC demands, Mandela affirmed to Botha in a 1989 letter, that any
solution needed to address the minority's fears as well as the majority's aspirations.
Certain of Mandela's qualities, such as his mix of aristocratic and democratic
propensities, or his combination of African and British cultural influences
appear to be idiosyncratic and essentially non-replicable. Other traits-such
as low egocentrism, sense of destiny, low distrust, gravitas, sociability, sense
of humor, optimism, reputation, and trustworthiness and integrity-are, by their
nature, difficult or impossible to inculcate. However, the crucial capacities
for cognitive complexity and "working empathy" may be fostered in
prospective peacemakers. Mediation trainers commonly emphasize skills in empathic
listening, interpersonal communication, mediator self-awareness, patience, non-judgmental
thinking, and tolerance for lack of control. Apprentice negotiators may be trained
in debate and persuasion skills, preparation, bargaining, rapport building,
emotional control, and even self-confidence.
The question of whether this combination of mediator and negotiator characteristics
is shared by other leaders of national or democratic liberation movements who
become accomplished peacemakers deserves further study. Mandela is justly included
in the ranks of great peacemakers because he redefined his personal interest
and that of his national group in terms that transcended those particular interests
and advocated universal principles of democracy and human rights and demonstrated
his readiness to give his life for this vision. He was perhaps uniquely able
to accomplish the transition from revolutionary leader to unifying symbol of
reconciliation because he combines the often contradictory characteristics of
partisan politician and integrative mediator.
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