Policy Review
COPYRIGHT 1996 Heritage Foundation
Wednesday, July 17, 1996
The lawyer's conscience. (19th century attorney David Hoffman)
Michael Krauss
To early generations of Americans, republicanism conveyed two concepts
of citizenship: "rights," which limited government, and
"responsibilities," which constituted civic virtue. If the former is
divorced from the latter, the law becomes a collection of morally
neutral legalisms and lawyers mere technicians of the law. The
disrepute of the legal profession today comes largely from this very
separation. One lawyer who spent his life trying to maintain the proper
connection between rights and responsibilities within the legal
profession was David Hoffman.
Hoffman was born in 1784, the 11th of 12 children of Dorothea and
Peter Hoffman, a prosperous Baltimore merchant. He attended St. John's
College in Annapolis for three years before returning to Baltimore,
where he apprenticed in law for another three years. Hoffman was the
only son who declined to enter the family business, but Hoffman & Sons
Dry Goods sometimes needed legal help, so his choice of profession
suited the family. By 1816, his practice in bustling Baltimore (then
the nation's third largest city) was bringing in $9,000 a year, a
lucrative sum at the time. Inclined toward scholarship, Hoffman was
unhappy with commercial practice, and in 1814 he accepted a part-time
position as the only professor of law at the University of Maryland.
In the early 19th century, law courses were available only at a few
law schools and colleges, one usually entered the legal profession
through an apprenticeship with a practicing lawyer. Yet Hoffman was
convinced that jurists of the new republic needed to study history and
philosophy to learn the timeless principles that supplemented the laws
and made legal precedents intelligible. He also feared that his
generation of legal practitioners was becoming too detached from the
philosophical underpinnings of the Founding to appreciate the vision of
law and lawyering required in republican America.
Hoffman set aside a growing share of his professional time to develop
a curriculum for the Maryland Law Institute. His Course of Legal Study,
published in 1817, was widely circulated and admired by America's legal
educators.
Even more than his insistence on substantive legal education,
however, Hoffman was concerned about the condition of ethical standards
in the legal profession. In his view, legal questions ultimately
resolved themselves into moral questions, and so his Course grounded
the discipline on clear, objective standards: "[W]e assume it as
undeniable that pure Ethics and Natural Law lie at the very foundation
of all laws." He believed that Jacksonian democracy was weakening the
barriers to excessive populism, and feared it would end in "mob rule,"
a situation incompatible with both legal order and objective truth.
Hoffman resolved that the lawyers he educated would not serve as
accessories to this crime and, as volume two of his Course of Legal
Study, he published Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment. This book was America's first code of legal ethics.
Fifty Resolutions is remarkable for its unrelenting contention that
representation of clients in no way absolves lawyers from the dictates
of conscience. "What is wrong is not less so from being common," states
Resolution 33. "What is morally wrong cannot be professionally right,
however it may be sanctioned by time or custom." "If, after duly
examining a case" admonishes Resolution 11, "I am persuaded that my
client's claim, or defense (as the case may be) cannot, or rather ought
not, be sustained, I will promptly advise him to abandon it." Although
a statute of limitations had a legitimate purpose, Hoffman maintained
in Resolution 41 that it was unethical for a lawyer to invoke it if his
client had acknowledged the plaintiff's claim. Another resolution
forbade lawyers from using their intellectual prowess to mislead jurors
into accepting unsound arguments.
In today's judicial arena, legal positivism - the view that there are
no legal obligations beyond statutory law - has triumphed. Codes of
professional responsibility" (laws prescribing state sanctions for
disobedience) have displaced canons of ethics. Compare Fifty
Resolutions with the American Bar Association's "Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility." For Hoffman, the existence of a knowable
truth obliged all officers of the court, including lawyers, to assist
in its discovery; for the ABA's "Model Rules" moral ambiguity frees
attorneys to act as result-oriented "hired guns." Under the Model
Rules," an attorney who refuses to invoke a statute of limitations on
behalf of a bad-faith debtor or who declines to advance an unsound but
convincing argument for his client can be disbarred. If an act is
legal, under the Model Rules, it must be ethical.
Hoffman's law school stagnated, the victim of underfunding and
bureaucracy. He ceased teaching, wrote popular essays, and lived in
England for several years. He died in 1854, discouraged at the
prospects for republican virtue in America. Despite limited success in
his lifetime, Hoffman was not a failure. A growing number of legal
educators today insist that ethics be taught to lawyers again. And
Hoffman - an obscure lawyer writing some 150 years ago - has emerged as
both an exemplar of good lawyering and the true father of legal ethics
in America.
Michael Krauss is a professor of law at George Mason University, in
Arlington, Virginia.